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Abstract 
 
The aim of this study is first to analyze models of bankruptcy prediction and to examine 
whether the financial crisis that we are being through could be forecasted it. Banking 
crises have developed many times throughout history, but in the middle of 2007 the 
global economy faced the worst financial crisis ever, which its consequences affect all 
the industries all over the world until now. This paper deals with the banking sector 
only. For that reason, at the first part, we present the US banking regulation system and 
an outline of Basel 1 and Basel 2. Afterwards, we examine the basic bankruptcy 
prediction models introduced by Beaver (1966), Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980), 
Zwijewski (1984) and Shumway (2001) and also the CAMEL framework. The sample 
of the empirical part consists of US bankrupt and nonbankrupt banks and their financial 
ratios and data are used into six logit models in order to examine which one of them 
could forecast better any possible future crash of the banking system. The results of the 
study show that bank default can be explained by profitability and leverage ratios and 
we concluded that the model that describes better bankruptcy includes the following 
variables: sales, retained earnings/total assets, EBIT/total assets, sales/total assets, total 
debt/total equity and auditors. The findings might be interesting and useful to several 
future researches and might function as via prevention and protection for the banking 
system.    
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1. Introduction 
 
The term banking can be applied to a large range of financial institutions, from loan 
organizations and savings to the large money-centre commercial banks in the USA, or 
from the smallest mutually owned building society to the  big four shareholder owned 
banks in the UK. A bank is a financial intermediary that accepts deposits and channels 
those deposits into lending activities. This can be done either directly or through capital 
market. A bank connects customers with capital deficits to customers with capital 
surpluses. Banks activities are to act as intermediaries between depositors and 
borrowers, to offer liquidity to their customers and to be engaging in asset 
transformation. It can be argued that there are three principal factors to improve 
financial performance for financial institutions; the institution size, its asset 
management, and the operational efficiency (Heffernan, 2005). Sometimes though, this 
effort has exactly different results and leads to the financial institution‘s default. 
Banks face a number of risks in order to conduct their business, and how well these 
risks are managed and understood is a key driver behind profitability, and how much 
capital a bank is required to hold. Banks are susceptible to many forms of risk which 
have triggered occasional systemic crises. Some of the main risks faced by banks 
include: 
 Credit risk: risk of loss arising from a borrower who does not make payments as 
promised. 
 Liquidity risk: risk that a given security or asset cannot be traded quickly enough 
in the market to prevent a loss (or make the required profit). 
 Market risk: risk that the value of a portfolio, either an investment portfolio or a 
trading portfolio, will decrease due to the change in value of the market risk 
factors. 
 Operational risk: risk arising from execution of a company's business functions 
(Damodaran, 2002). 
Banking crises have developed many times throughout history, when one or more risks 
have materialized for a banking sector as a whole. In the middle of 2007 the global 
economy faced the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of 1930. The global 
banking system until 2006 was one of the most profitable sectors. Easy credit 
conditions, growth of the housing bubble, increased debt burden, deregulation, complex 
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financial instruments and most of all the greediness of some people are only some of the 
main reasons that drove the economy into a crisis. The failure of large financial 
institutions in the United States was only the ―top of the iceberg‖ and the beginning of a 
new era that afflicted many countries all over the world. The crisis became visible the 
September of 2008 with the default of Lehman Brothers. The crisis created liquidity 
problems and changed the credit conditions all over the world. The final results of this 
crisis have not been seen yet, since the crisis is still ongoing. Though, until today, we 
can definitely claim that has influenced all the sectors of the economy and the effects of 
this phenomenon are visible. Bankruptcies, mergers and acquisitions, job losses, banks 
solvency, decline in the consumer wealth, decline in the indexes of the stock markets etc 
are only some of the effects of that crisis (Baily and Elliott, 2009).  
A statement of the objective is very important since they attach purpose and the 
direction of the whole process. The main objective of this study is to construct a 
bankruptcy prediction model and to define which parameters influence the performance 
of a bank. To accomplish that, we tend to run a model with any data available of US 
banks. The reason that we select United States is because United States has the most 
banks in the world in terms of institutions (7,085 at the end of 2008) and possibly 
branches (82,000). Furthermore, US financial institutions are responsible for the 
banking crisis all over the world. 
The dissertation consists of eight chapters and proceeds as follows. The first chapter is 
the introductory chapter, whereas we define the term banking and we analyze which are 
the main factors which create the financial chaos and led many financial institutions to 
bankruptcy. We also define the context of the thesis and its objectives. The second 
chapter, since in the United States, the banking industry is a highly regulated industry 
with detailed and focused regulators, by both the federal and state governments, 
summarizes the US banking regulation system. Since one of the main reasons of the 
financial crisis is the deregulation of the banking system, we present how an organized 
regulation system makes sure that banks operate prudently and do not fail. Furthermore, 
we present Basel 1 and Basel 2, which outline regulatory guidelines for bank‘s 
operations and risk management. This chapter ends with the discussion of the three 
pillars which are introduced by Basel 2. 
The next section following US banking regulation system discusses the relevant 
literature and summarizes the theoretical background relating to the bankruptcy 
prediction, both the statistical methods and the theoretical procedures, and bank 
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performance indicators. In this chapter we present that the prediction models are divided 
into three basic categories: the statistical models, the artificially intelligent expert 
system (AIES) models and the theoretical models. In this section, we present the basic 
prediction models from 1966 to today. Furthermore, we discuss financial predictor 
indicators; more specifically, we examine the five key aspects of a bank‘s operation as 
according to the CAMEL framework. The next chapter is referring to the methodology 
that we will use which we are based to build our bankruptcy prediction method. In our 
study we will use a logit model by taking as dependent variable the event of bankruptcy 
and as independent variables different financial indicators, which are used in models of 
Beaver (1966), Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980), Zwijewski (1984), Shumway (2001) and 
Chava and Jarrow (2004).  
The fifth chapter contains the data analysis and describes the data derived from the 
Tomsonone banker database, which covers 493 US banks; this is a sample which 
consists of also bankrupt and non-bankrupt banks, the explanatory and the dependent 
variables used in the estimation. The next chapter presents the empirical findings that 
extracted from the whole process and will be consisted of six different models, although 
with the same methodology. Our purpose is to distinguish which of the financial 
indicators are statistically significant and explain bankruptcy better according to the 
model parameters. The seventh chapter presents all the concluding remarks of the thesis, 
any further investigation comments and the limitations that we are faced during the 
whole procedure. The last section presents the references used in our paper. 
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2. US Regulation System of the Banking Sector 
 
Banks play a crucial role in the economy by offering payment services and providing 
credit. Because any disruption to the banking system could have widespread effects on 
business and people, all governments regulate banking. When a bank makes a large 
number of loans that borrowers cannot repay, the bank‘s liabilities (deposits and 
borrowing) could exceed the bank‘s assets, rendering the bank insolvent. Insolvency 
means when a bank‘s liabilities exceed its assets-it has zero or negative equity. Without 
adequate liquidity, a bank may have insufficient cash readily available to pay its 
depositors‘ claims when they come due. This inability to make payments when they are 
due is termed illiquidity, and can lead to liquidity crisis. A liquidity crisis, in turn, can 
lead to a bank default (Apostolik, Donohue and Went, 2009). 
Avoiding a run on a bank is a chief concern for a bank‘s stakeholders, including the 
management, the shareholders, the customers, and of course the employees. Effective 
bank regulation reduces systemic risk by addressing non-systemic risks and making sure 
that individual banks operate prudently and do not fail. 
For a long time, banking regulation was national. That is, governments and their 
regulatory agencies developed rules and tanking supervisory guidelines specific to the 
country‘s needs. Regulatory rules differed significantly between countries. It was 1988, 
when Basel I Accord was release, did international banking regulations take shape. Both 
Basel I and the Basel II Accords outline regulatory guidelines for international bank‘s 
operations and risk management (Apostolik, Donohue and Went, 2009). 
After the failure of the Herstatt Bank, the central bank governor of developed BIS, 
established the Basel Committee. The Basel Committee is a forum for regulatory 
cooperation between its member countries on banking supervision-related matters.  The 
Basel Committee advanced two Accords and one amendment. 
The 1988 Basel Accord was a watershed because it established Basel‘s main raison d‘ 
etre: to focus on the effective supervision of international banking operations through 
greater coordination among international bank supervisors and regulations.  The 1988 
Basel Accord established a single set of capital adequacy standards for international 
banks of participating countries from January 1993. (Heffernan, 2005) 
In response to criticism of the 1988 Accord, a number of changes were made, 
culminating in the 2001 proposal. Basell II is the second of the Basel Accords which are 
recommendations on banking laws and regulations issued by the Basel Committee on 
13 
 
Banking Supervision. The purpose of the Basel II is to create an international standard 
that banking regulators can use when creating regulations about how much capital 
banks need to put aside to guard against the types of financial and operational risks 
banks face. It also aimed to broaden the risks, banks considered, when calculating their 
minimum capital requirements. 
The new Accord seeks to achieve the following objectives: 
 It moves away from the ―one size fits all‖ approach characteristic of Basel I. The 
emphasis is on ―mix and match‖ where, each bank can choose from a number of 
options to determine its capital charge for market, credit and operational risk. 
 Recognition that in terms of credit risk, lending to banks or corporate can be 
more or less risky than to OECD sovereigns. 
 Explicit recognition of operational risk, with capital to be set aside. Though 
overall the amount of capital set aside should remain at 8% of total risk assets. 
 Subject to the approval of national regulators, banks will be allowed to use their 
own internal rating models for the measurements of credit, market and 
operational risk. 
 In addition to the new ―risk pillar‖, new ―supervisory‖ and ―market discipline‖ 
pillars have been introduced. 
 
2.1 Three Pillars 
Basel II uses three pillars, which their main concept concerns: 1) minimum capital 
requirements (addressing risk), 2) supervisory review and 3) market discipline to 
promote greater stability in the financial system. (Heffernan, 2005) 
 
2.1.1 The first pillar 
 
The first pillar sets minimum capital requirements designed to improve upon the 
standardized rules set forth in the 1988 Accord. It deals with maintenance of regulatory 
capital calculated for three major components of risk that a bank faces. Measurement of 
risk assets ratio changed to include:  
 New measurement of credit risk 
 Measurement of market risk (unchanged since 1966) 
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 Measurement of operational risk 
Under the first pillar, banks can choose from different alternatives of varying 
complexity to calculate their minimum regulatory capital requirements and also Basel II 
represents the first attempt to assign a regulatory capital charge to the management of 
operational risk (Apostolik, Donohue and Went, 2009).  
 
2.1.2 The second pillar 
 
The second pillar complements and strengthens the first pillar by establishing a 
prudential supervision process. It deals with the regulatory response to the first pillar, 
giving regulators much improved tools over those available to them under Basel I. It 
also provides a framework for dealing with all the other risks which a bank may face, 
such as pension risk, strategic risk, systemic risk, concentration risk, liquidity risk, 
reputation risk and legal risk which the accord combines under the title of residual risk. 
It gives banks a power to review their risk management system (Apostolik, Donohue 
and Went, 2009). 
 
2.1.3 The third pillar 
 
The third pillar outlines the effective use of market discipline as a lever to strengthen 
disclosure and encourage sound banking practices. Market discipline is public 
disclosure of a bank‘s financial condition to depositors and other interested parties, 
allowing these to assess the condition of the bank. 
 
2.2 US bank’s supervisory authorities 
 
The central bank and banks supervisory functions in the USA have evolved to create a 
US banking and financial structure which, by the late 20
th
 century, was notably different 
from those in other western countries. There are several factors that can explain its 
unique structure: 
1. US regulators have been far more inclined to seek statutory remedies in the 
event of a new problem, resulting in a plethora of legislation. 
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2. The protection of small depositors has been considered an important objective 
since the 1930s. 
3. Concern about potential collusion among banks and between banks and 
regulators has received as much weight in the USA as measures were put in 
place to preserve the stability of the banking system. 
The USA has been inclined to seek statutory remedies whenever a serious problem in 
the banking/financial sector arises. This is one reason for its unique financial structure. 
Given the extensive amount of legislation passed since the 1930s, and related litigation 
(Apostolik, Donohue and Went, 2009). 
The Federal Reserve Systems (FRS) is one of several regulators of US banks. To 
operate as a bank, a firm must obtain a national or state charter granted by either the 
Comptroller of the Currency or by the state official, usually called the Superintendent of 
Banks. The origin of the charter determines the bank‘s main regulator. In a national 
charter, the bank must be regulated by the FRS, which is optional for state chartered 
banks. (Heffernan, 2005) 
The membership of the FRS has costs and benefits that arising from it. The costs are 
bank examination, conducted by officers from the Comptroller of the Currency at least 
three times every two years.  Bank examiners use composite scores from the CAMEL 
scores system to evaluate banks. Banks are scored on a scale of 1 (the best) to 5 (the 
worst), using five criteria: 
 C: capital adequacy 
 A: asset quality 
 M: management quality 
 E: earnings performance 
 L: Liquidity 
A composite score is produced and banks with scores of 1 or 2 are considered 
satisfactory. Additional supervision is indicated if the score falls between 3 and 5. 
Banks scoring 4 or 5 are closely monitored and when the score is 5, signals that 
examiners think the bank is likely to fail. The examinations are meant to prevent fraud 
and to ensure a bank is complying with the various rules and regulations related to its 
balance sheet and off-balance sheet holding (Heffernan, 2005). Further analysis about 
CAMEL framework follows in another section. 
Three organizations have the authority to examine banks and the Federal Depositor 
Insurance Corporation has the right to examine insured banks. To avoid duplication, the 
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Fed, Comptroller of Currency and FDIC normally examine, respectively, state 
member‘s banks, national member banks and the non-member insured banks. 
The Federal Reserve is the central bank of the United States. The Fed as it is commonly 
referred is responsible for regulating the US monetary system, how much is printed and 
how it is distributed, as well as monitoring the operations of holding companies, 
including traditional banking groups and banks. (Heffernan, 2005) 
As the economic world evolved into a global community, it was inevitable that large 
corporate holdings of assets across national geographic boundaries would, on occasion, 
become internationally distressed. Since nations‘ bankruptcy differ dramatically, 
corporate can often file in the environment most conductive to preserving their assets 
and if possible to avoid liquidation. Most countries outside United States have more 
restrictive bankruptcy laws favoring creditors, and the usual result of a bankruptcy in 
these areas is liquidation. On the other hand, very large firms can often depend on some 
type of government or quasi-government bailout in order to preserve employment and 
reduce economic friction. 
Even with the changes in the US Bankruptcy Act of 2005, there is little doubt that the 
US bankruptcy laws are friendlier and more flexible to the debtor and, as a result, firms 
will usually put for a US filing, or at least a filing in two countries if he debtor has 
significant business in the US and its headquarters abroad (Altman and Hotchkiss, 
2005). 
The differences in bankruptcy systems globally are beginning to get the attention of 
international scholars, regulators and institutes. For example, the International 
Insolvency Institute was instrumental in working with the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the US Congress to enact the 
UNCITRAL (is an important United Nations entity, headquartered in Vienna, Austria, 
which conducts major studies on international trade laws and has produced a number of 
international conventions and model laws, which have been widely adopted around the 
world) Model Law on Cross-Boarder Insolvency (Altman and Hotchkiss, 2005). 
The costs of financial distress and legal proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code are 
important for obvious practical reasons. For small firms, the costs, involved in 
reorganization, can often exceed any remaining firm value, explaining why so many 
smaller cases end up with the firm being distressed. For larger firms, the dollar 
magnitude of professional fees has become concern, particularly in many of the recent 
multibillion-dollar cases (Altman and Hotchkiss, 2006). 
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Distress costs have also been recognized as an important determinant of the pricing of a 
firm‘s debt and of its capital structure. Although there are some debates about how 
significant their impact might be. Haugen and Senbet (1978) were among the first who 
argued that bankruptcy costs should not be significant because claimants in financial 
distress should be able to negotiate outside of court without affecting the value of the 
underlying firm. In recent years, however, scholars such as Jensen (1991) note that not 
only the conflicts between  creditors groups, but also the influence of certain bankruptcy 
court decisions have had a negative impact on firm‘s ability to renegotiate their claims 
out of court. When a firm is unable to complete an out of court reorganization, it may be 
unable to avoid a more costly court-supervised bankruptcy proceeding (Altman and 
Hotchkiss, 2006). 
The costs of financial distress are typically classified as either direct or indirect. Direct 
costs include out-of-pocket expenses for lawyers, accountants, restructuring advisers, 
expert witnesses. Indirect costs include a wide range of unobservable opportunity costs.  
Bankruptcy in the United States is an administrative process, and the factors that lead to 
reliable estimate of value in a market process are sometimes absent in bankruptcy 
(Altman and Hotchkiss, 2006).  
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3. Literature review 
 
According to Chava and Jarrow (2004) approach bankruptcy has been set as the default 
event since a company or its creditors filing with a federal bankruptcy court for 
protection and shows officially that the company is not capable of service its debt or pay 
its creditors. A broader definition of bank failure is when a bank is deemed to have 
―failed‖ if it is liquidated, merged with a healthy bank (or purchased and acquired) 
under central government supervision/pressure, or rescued with state financial support 
(Heffernan, 2005). 
Bankers, economists and regulators generally accept that banks are special and that 
bank runs or failures are costly to the economy. Therefore, banking stability is afforded 
the utmost importance. There is an urgent need to identify banks that are more prone to 
financial distress, before the effects of its financial instability can be felt in the 
economy. 
Some think that a failing bank should be treated the same way as a failing firm in any 
other industry. Others claim that failure justifies government protection of the banking 
system because of its potential for devastating systemic effects on an economy. Direct 
costs such as professional fees, court costs and document preparation as well as indirect 
costs including reduced bargaining power with depositors and higher interest rates for 
lines of credit are both related to the bankruptcy procedure (Moulton and Thomas, 
1993). Furthermore, the question of what causes failure will always be of interest to 
investors, unprotected depositors and the bank employees who lose their jobs. 
The literature emphasizes that institutional features of economies, such as the existence 
of deposit insurance and a market-determined interest rate structure, affect the 
profitability of banks and the incentives of bank managers to take on risk in lending 
operations and consequently may cause financial distress. Banking systems may be 
particularly vulnerable in times of rapid financial liberalization and greater market 
competition, when banks are taking on new and unfamiliar risks on both the asset, and 
liability side of balance sheets. Weak supervisory and regulatory policies under these 
circumstances also may give financial institutions with low capital ratios incentives to 
increase their risk positions in newly competitive environments and allow them to avoid 
full responsibility for mistakes in monitoring and evaluating risk (Hutchison and 
McDill, 1999). 
The prediction of a company failure is a well defined subject and many academicians 
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the last decades proceeded into research in order to model the bankruptcy prediction. 
Due to Aziz and Dar paper, the prediction models are divided into three basic 
categories: the statistical models, the artificially intelligent expert system (AIES) 
models and the theoretical models. The statistical models focus on symptoms of failure 
and are drawn mainly from the company‘s accounts. Classical statistical models include 
both univariate and multivariate analysis. On the other hand, AIES models are usually 
multivariate in nature and have evolved to serve essentially the same functions as 
knowledge in human intelligence and reasoning depending on computer technology. 
The theoretical models focus on and determine the qualitative causes of bankruptcy, 
where they employ statistical techniques to provide a quantitative support to the 
theoretical arguments. 
The models of bankruptcy prediction began in 1966 when Beaver presented empirical 
evidence that certain financial ratios most notably cash flow/total debt, gave statistically 
significant signals well before actual business failure. Beaver‘s univariate approach 
adopts ‗paired sampling‘ for assessing the accuracy of a variety of ratios. His published 
sample contains 79 companies which failed during the years 1954 to 1964 from 38 
industries. Beaver concludes that cash flow to debt ratio is the single best predictor. 
However, models which focus on a single ratio are simplistic and unable to capture the 
complexity of financial failure, given that the financial status of a company is 
multidimensional and no single measure is able to capture all dimensions (Zavgren, 
1983).  
Altman in 1968 extended the Beaver‘s analysis by developing a linear discriminant 
analysis (LDA) which combines ratios in a multivariate analysis and concluded in the 
following function: 
Z= 1.2 Z1 + 1.4 Z2 + 3.3 Z3 + 0.6 Z4 +0.999 Z5  (1) 
Where, 
Z1= working capital/total assets 
Z2= retained earnings/total assets 
Z3= earnings before interest and taxes/total assets 
Z4= market value of equity/book value of total liabilities 
Z5=sales/total assets 
Firms with Z-scores less than 2,675 are predicted to be bankrupt, and firms with Z-
scores greater than 2,675 are predicted not to be bankrupt (Wang and Campbell, 2010). 
The approach first constructs the profile of a company on the basis of its published 
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financial accounts and then compares it with the profiles of known financially healthy 
or previously insolvent companies. The closer the company in question resembles 
previous insolvency, the more likely it is to fail and vice versa (Wong and Thomas, 
2010). 
Deakin (1972) advanced the research of Beaver and Altman by including the fourteen 
important ratios identified by Beaver with the multivariate methodology of Altman. 
Using a sample of 32 failed and 32 nonfailed firms, Deakin found that cash flow 
coverage to total debt was important for predicting bankruptcy. 
Discriminant analysis (DA) is often the first approach to consider when discriminating 
between different groups of objects. DA is a multivariate statistical technique that leads 
to the development of a discriminant function maximizing the ratio of among-group to 
within-group variability, assuming that the variables follow a multivariate normal 
distribution and that the dispersion matrices of the groups are equal. The discriminant 
function can be linear or quadratic, and the corresponding models are referred to as 
Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) and Quadratic Discriminant Analysis (QDA) 
(Doumpos and Zopounidis, 1999). 
Beyond the univariate models that used Altman(1968) and Beaver(1966) there are 
variety of models that are used in the academic literature such as Multiple Discriminant 
Analysis (MDA), logit, probit, linear probability model (LPM), cumulative sums 
procedures, neural networks, case-based reasoning models etc but the most commonly 
used is the MDA model. MDA is used to classify a categorical dependent which has 
more than two categories, using as predictors a number of interval or dummy 
independent variables. MDA is sometimes also called discriminant factor analysis or 
canonical discriminant analysis. Bankruptcy score is used to classify firms into bankrupt 
and non-bankrupt firms according to their individual characteristics.  
Logit expresses the probability of failure of a firm as a dichotomous dependent variable 
that is a function of a vector of explanatory variables. The dichotomous dependent 
variable of a logit model is the logarithm of the odds (probability) that an event will 
occur. The probability values are between 0 and 1 where 0 indicates bankruptcy and 
values closer to 1 the less the chance of the firm to become bankrupt. Τhe essence of the 
logit regression model is that it assigns firms to the failing or the non-failing group 
based on their logit score and a certain cut-off score for the model. In the case where a 
high logit score indicates a high failure probability, a firm is classified into the failing 
group if its logit score exceeds the cut-off point and into the nonfailing group if its score 
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is lower than or equal to the cut-off point (Wong and Thomas, 2010). The logit models 
assume a logistic distribution while the probit models assume a cumulative normal 
distribution. Logit analysis is a model that is used by Ohlson (1980), Zwijewski (1984) 
and Shumway (2001).  
Ohlson (1980) employs logistic regression to predict company failure. He attempted to 
provide some improvement in the area of financial distress research by employing some 
unique ratios in addition to traditional ratios and he used nine measures of firms‘ size, 
leverage, liquidity, and performance. Based on a sample that included 105 bankrupt and 
2,058 nonbankrupt industrial firms, his model was 
Y = -1.3 - 0.4 Y1 + 6.0 Y2 - 1.4 Y3 + 0.1 Y4 -2.4 Y5 - 1.8 Y6 + .3Y7 -1.7 Y8 - 0.5Y9  (2) 
where: 
Y1 = log(total assets/GNP price-level index); 
Y2 = total liabilities/total assets; 
Y3 = working capital/ total assets; 
Y4 = current liabilities/current assets; 
Y5 = one if total liabilities exceed total assets, zero otherwise; 
Y6 = net income/ total assets; 
Y7 = funds provided by operations/total liabilities; 
Y8 = one if net income was negative for the last two years, zero otherwise; 
Y9 = measure of change in net income; 
Y = overall index. 
The model was 96 per cent effective in classifying the firms in the year prior to failure.  
Ohlson used data that were derived from reports at least three months before company 
was delisted (Wang and Campbell, 2010) and also reports that the majority of bankrupt 
firms had not received a ―going-concern qualification‖ or disclaimer of opinion and that 
a number of these firms even paid dividends in the year prior to bankruptcy 
(Charalambidis and Papadopoulos, 2006). 
Zmijewski (1984) used financial ratios that measured firm performance, leverage, and 
liquidity to develop his model. The ratios were not selected on a theoretical basis, but 
rather, on the basis of their performance in prior studies. Zmijewski estimated the model 
using probit analysis, which weights the log-likelihood function by the ratio of the 
population frequency rate to the sample frequency rate of the individual groups, 
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bankrupt and nonbankrupt. Zmijewski‘s probit model based on 40 bankrupt and 800 
nonbankrupt industrial firms was 
X = - 4.3 - 4.5 X1 + 5.7 X2 - 0.004 X3   (3) 
where: 
X1 = net income/total assets; 
X2 = total debt/total assets; 
X3 = current assets/current liabilities; 
X = overall index. 
The probit model represents another type of widely used statistical models for studying 
data with binomial distributions. Probit models are generalized linear models with a 
probit link: 
η=Φ-1(μ)  (4) 
The probit model is used for studying a binary outcome variable outcome. The probit 
model takes on only one intuitively meaningful form, because a probit model expressed 
in η is a linear regression of the Z score of the event probability.  The interpretation of a 
probit model is identical to that of a logit results except from the difference in the 
cumulative distribution functions (Liao, 1994). It is possible to substitute the normal 
cumulative distribution function, rather than logistic, to obtain the probit model (Aziz 
and Dar, 2004) 
Shumway (2001), in his paper, propose a dynamic approach known as hazard rate 
model where as the dependent variable in the modeling is the time spent by a firm in the 
healthy group and indicates whether the firm is filed for bankruptcy or not. The same 
pattern follows Campbell, as well, but is more accurate since it includes additional 
variation such as new accounting and macro variables (Topaloglu and Yildirim, 2009). 
Chava and Jarrow (2004) compare Altman (1968), Zmijewski (1984) and Shumway 
(2001) in their respective predictive powers for bankruptcy. The total of 1.197 
bankruptcies were extracted for the period 1962-1999, 7 years more than that of 
Shumway. The forecasting accuracy of the models estimated with 1962-90 data over the 
years 1991- 99 showed the superiority of Shumway's model to the other two. A private 
firm model was implemented excluding market variables from the hazard rate 
estimation, and compared to the public firm model with all the variables; it is their 
claim that the accounting variables add little predictive power when market variables 
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are in the model. By them, Shumway's model was extended to contain industry effect 
dummies using four digit SIC codes, financial companies and monthly data; and all of 
them were found to be accurate and significant in bankruptcy prediction (Topaloglu and 
Yildirim, 2009). 
Duffie, Saita, and Wang (2007) emphasize that the probability of failure depends on the 
horizon one is considering. They estimate mean-reverting time series processes for 
macroeconomic and firm-specific predictors of failure and combine these with a short-
horizon failure model to find the marginal probabilities of failure at different horizons 
(Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagui, 2008). 
Neural network performs classification in a way intended to emulate brain processes. 
Signal processing continues until a classifying decision is reached (with a probability, 
the firm will fail) that satisfies pre-specified criteria (Aziz and Dar, 2006). Neural 
network models are powerful and have become a popular alternative with the ability to 
incorporate a very large number of features in an adaptive nonlinear model (Kay and 
Titterington, 2000). 
Daniel Berg (2005), in his report, introduced the generalized additive models, GAM, as 
a flexible non-parametric alternative for bankruptcy prediction and show that it 
performs significantly better than discriminant analysis, linear models and neural 
networks. GAM is a non-parametric generalization of the linear regression model. It 
replaces the usual linear function of a covariate with a sum of unspecified smooth 
functions, helping us discover potential non-linear shapes of covariate effects. The 
shape of the smooth function is determined by the data through iterative smoothing 
operations. The estimation of neural networks and generalized additive models is 
computationally more demanding than for linear models, but with the rapidly increasing 
power of computers we expect an increasing application of such models in practice. 
Except the statistical prediction models, there are also theoretical models. According to 
Theil (1969) and Lev (1973) a way of predicting financial distress is to examine 
changes in the structure of the balance sheets and income statements under the argument 
that firms try to maintain in equilibrium in their financial structure. If these statements, 
considered being uncontrollable, one can foresee financial distress. Furthermore, 
familiar theory could be considered, the cash management theory, whereas an 
imbalance between cash inflows and outflows would mean failure of cash management 
function of the firm, which may cause financial distress to the firm and ultimately 
bankruptcy (Laitinen and Laitinen, 1998). Another theoretical theory is the gambler‘s 
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ruin theory. In the approach, Scott (1981) considers firm as a gambler and due to the 
probability of loss the certain amount of cash flows will be decreased, ultimately 
leading to bankruptcy (Aziz and Dar, 2006).   
The most significant theoretical model is the credit risk theory which is linked to the 
Basel 1 and Basel 2 accords. Credit risk is the risk that any counterparty will default for 
whatever reason. Credit risk metrics are based on theories of corporate finance. Models 
capture the essential characteristics of credit default events and allow explicit 
calculation of a full loss distribution for a portfolio of credit exposure. Further 
discussion of this theory was presented previously when we analyzed the legal 
environment which banks operate. 
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3.1 Bank Performance Indicators 
 
The financial performance of banks is important for shareholders, depositors and other 
creditors. It takes on a special significance from a social perspective, when a bank 
experiences financial distress and eventually fails. It is important to recognize which 
areas of a bank‘s operations should be examined. While there are many indicators to the 
financial performance of commercial banks, the focus is on five key aspects of a bank‘s 
operation as according to the CAMEL framework. CAMEL model has been used very 
successfully by many researchers to evaluate the operational and financial performance 
of banks. A key product of such an exam is a supervisory rating of the bank's overall 
condition, commonly referred to as CAMELS rating (Gilbert, Meyer and Vaughan, 
2000). This rating system is used by the three federal banking supervisors (the Federal 
Reserve, the FDIC, and the OCC) and other financial supervisory agencies to provide a 
convenient summary of bank conditions at the time of an exam.  
The acronym "CAMEL" refers to the five components of a bank's condition that are 
assessed: Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, and Liquidity. A 
sixth component, a bank's sensitivity to market risk was added in 1997; hence the 
acronym was changed to CAMELS. Ratings are assigned for each component in 
addition to the overall rating of a bank's financial condition. The ratings are assigned on 
a scale from 1 to 5. Banks with ratings of 1 or 2 are considered to present few, if any, 
supervisory concerns, while banks with ratings of 3, 4, or 5 present moderate to extreme 
degrees of supervisory concern. They are significant and useful in reflecting the bank 
performance and recognize their financial distress (Rahman and Tan, 2004).  
Capital adequacy can reduce risk and absorb losses. Capital can support the financing 
and operation of a bank, provide protection to depositors and other creditors, and arouse 
confidence in depositors and regulators (Rose, 1999). The most widely used indicator of 
capital adequacy is capital to risk-weighted assets ratio (CRWA). According to Bank 
Supervision Regulation Committee (The Basle Committee) of Bank for International 
Settlements, a minimum 8 percent CRWA is required. Capital adequacy ultimately 
determines how well financial institutions can cope with shocks to their balance sheets. 
It is useful to track capital-adequacy ratios that take into account the most important 
financial risks—foreign exchange, credit, and interest rate risks—by assigning risk 
weightings to the institution‘s assets and it is expressed as a percentage of a bank's risk 
weighted credit exposures. 
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Asset quality of a bank plays the main role in shaping the current and future profitability 
of the financial institution (Rahman and Tan, 2004). The deteriorating value of assets, 
being prime source of banking problems, directly pour into other areas, as losses are 
eventually written-off against capital, which ultimately jeopardizes the earning capacity 
of the institution. Since loans exhibit the highest default rates, the asset quality of a bank 
will deteriorate when there is an increasing number of non-performing loans (NPL). 
Assuming a bank increases its provision for loan losses, there will be a decrease in the 
reported earnings, hence affecting the profitability of a bank for the current time period. 
Asset quality is also found to be a ‗statistically significant predictor of insolvency‘ 
(Allen and Yong, 1997). Studies have shown that a bank‘s management quality is 
strongly related to the asset quality of a bank. Failing banks tend to incur high costs and 
generate low profits in addition to possessing a high level of NPL (Berger, 1997).  
Management quality determines the future of the bank. The management manages a 
bank‘s operations and the quality of loans and has to guarantee that the bank is 
profitable. In addition, performance evaluation includes compliance with set norms, 
ability to plan and react to changing circumstances, technical competence, leadership 
and administrative ability. Furthermore, given the qualitative nature of management, it 
is difficult to judge its soundness just by looking at financial accounts of the banks. 
Nevertheless, efficiency ratios demonstrate how efficiently the company uses its assets 
and how efficiently the company manages its operations. The net operating margin, the 
turnover ratio, the net interest margin, and the non-interest margin are efficiency 
measures as well as profitability measures. They indicate how well management and 
employees keep the increase of revenues. 
Profitability is one of the most important performance magnitudes for any bank. Three 
popular profitability measures that bank regulatory authorities and analysts use are 
return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and net interest. Each of these ratios 
looks at a different part of bank profitability. The ROA ratio is result of dividing a 
bank‘s net income by its average assets. A low ROA may either be because of 
conservative lending and investment policies or excessive operating expenses. On the 
other hand, a high ROA may be the result of efficient operations, a low ratio of time and 
savings deposits to total deposits, or of high yields earned on the assets (Damodaran, 
2002). More specifically, this determines the capacity to absorb losses, finance its 
expansion, pay dividends to its shareholders, and build up an adequate level of capital. 
ROA gives an idea as to how efficient management is at using its assets to generate 
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earnings. The ROE ratio is calculated by dividing a bank‘s net income by its average 
total equity. When a bank‘s ROE is very high, it appears to be performing well from the 
viewpoint of the shareholders. It may also mean that the bank is heavily leveraged and 
considerably riskier.  
The net interest margin measures the magnitude of a spread between interest revenues 
and interest costs that management has been able to achieve. A bank has to maintain 
control over its earning assets and pursue the cheapest sources of funding to accomplish 
this objective. It is calculated by subtracting a bank‘s interest expense from its interest 
revenue, net of loan losses, and dividing that result by its net interest earning assets 
(Brealey, Myers, and Allen, 2008).  
Banks need liquidity to meet deposit withdrawals and satisfy customer loan demand. 
Faced with liquidity risk, a bank may be forced to borrow funds at an excessive cost to 
cover its immediate cash needs, hence reducing its earnings. Banks need to have a 
sound liquidity management to avoid incurring a high liquidity risk (Heffernan, 2005). 
This ensures that immediate funds will be available at the lowest cost. A bank is 
considered to be liquid when it has sufficient liquidity and cash and other liquid assets, 
together with the ability to raise funds quickly from other sources, to enable it to meet 
its payment obligation and financial commitments in a timely manner (Reed and Gill, 
1989). Most troubled banks have problems in their loan portfolio. These banks often 
have inadequate control systems for spotting problem loans early. Management may be 
too aggressive in expanding the bank‘s loans by overlending. There are many ratios that 
we can evaluate in order to measure the liquidity leverage such as the long term to 
equity ratio and the total debt to equity, whereas it is a measure of a company's financial 
leverage calculated by dividing its long term or total debt by stockholders' equity. It 
indicates what proportion of equity and debt the company is using to finance its assets 
Sensitivity to Market Risk refers to the risk that changes in market conditions could 
adversely impact earnings and/or capital. Market Risk encompasses exposures 
associated with changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, commodity prices, 
equity prices, etc. Risk sensitivity is mostly evaluated in terms of management‘s ability 
to monitor and control market risk. Banks are increasingly involved in diversified 
operations, all of which are subject to market risk, particularly in the setting of interest 
rates and the carrying out of foreign exchange transactions. In countries that allow 
banks to make trades in stock markets or commodity exchanges, there is also a need to 
monitor indicators of equity and commodity price risk. 
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4. Methodology 
 
In this section we are going to develop the methodology which we are based to build 
our bankruptcy prediction method. To investigate the banked financial distress 
indicators we separate our sample into the dependent variable, which is the bankruptcy 
and into the independent variables, which are earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), 
retained earnings, total liabilities, total common equity, total debt, total assets, retained 
earnings to total assets, EBIT to total assets, sales, to total assets, total debt to total 
common equity, return on assets, return on equity, net interest margin, total debt to 
equity and auditors. We let the set of explanatory variables to be denoted by x and the 
explained variable is denoted by the binary variable y which takes values between zero 
in non-bankruptcy case and one in the case of default (Hwa Tan, Hew and San Tan, 
2004). Furthermore we calculated the ratios of each banks from 2001 to 2006. In the 
next section, we present analytically the sample and both the explanatory and 
independent variables. 
We used the statistic program of SPSS to run a logistic regression. We used the logistic 
regression analysis as appropriate when the dependent variable can be grouped into 
discrete states (Hwa Tan, Hew and San Tan, 2004). Our target, in this study, is to 
explain whether the bankruptcy could be predicted. For that reason, we have chosen this 
technique because allows us estimating the probability that an event occurs or not, by 
predicting a binary dependent outcome from a set of independent variables. Logit 
regression is a method from Statistics where we try to obtain a functional relationship 
between a transformation from a qualitative variable called logit and predictor variables 
which can be either quantitative or qualitative (Erdogan, 2008). The aim in a logistic 
regression analysis is to find the best fitting model to describe the relationship between 
a set of independent variables and the dichotomous characteristics of dependent 
variable. A difficult stage is when we come to the point of the selection of predictors for 
our bankruptcy prediction model. The problem derives from the thing that financial 
theory does not indicate which variable should be involved in. The forward stepwise 
procedure is the most popular search method if we want to develop a bankruptcy 
prediction model. It is useful when the researchers attempt to consider a relationship 
between large numbers of independent variables for inclusion in the function (Zhou and 
Elhag, 2007).  
A logistic regression can be used in two ways a) as a categorical target variable that has 
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exactly two categories and b) as a continuous target variable that has values between 0 
and 1 which represent probabilities values or proportions. 
In our model we defined a binary random variable Y for the default event where Y=0 
indicates that the bank shall never default, while Y=1 indicates that the company shall 
eventually default and the probability of default is given by P(x) = Prob (Y=1,x) (5) 
(Topaloglu and Yildirim, 2009). 
We assume that the marginal probability of failure or bankruptcy over the periods we 
choose follow a logistic distribution and is given by:  
Pi= E(Yit=1|Xi) = 
 
                  
 = 
 
          
  (6) 
where: Zi = β1 + β2Χi  (7) 
 Yit is an indicator that equals one if the firm goes bankrupt, whereas xi is the vector of 
explanatory variables. Zi ranges from -∞ to +∞ and Pi ranges between 0 and 1.An 
estimation problem has been arisen since Pi in nonlinear not only for the X, but also the 
β‘s. This means that we cannot use the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) procedure to 
estimate the parameters.  
The probability of a bankruptcy Pi is given by the following equation:  
 
          
  (8). 
The probability that a bank shall never default is equal to 1- Pi =  
 
         
 (9). 
By taking the ratio of  
  
    
is the odds of a bank to bankrupt to a bank that will never 
default. If we take the natural logarithm of the 
  
    
 = Li = Zi = β1 + β2Χi. (10). L is 
called the logit (Vasicht, 2006). 
A higher level of Zi indicates a higher probability of bankruptcy or failure (Campbell, 
Hilscher and Szilagyi, 2008). 
Furthermore, we run six different regressions in SPSS and in each separate model we 
change the independent variables with a different one in order to examine which 
variable explains better the model. In the following table we present all six models with 
the dependent variables that we use. 
Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Ret.Earnings Sales EBIT Liabilities/Assets Total Assets Total Debt 
RetEarn/Assets RetEarn/Assets RetEarn/Assets RetEarn/Assets RetEarn/Assets RetEarn/Assets 
EBIT/Assets EBIT/Assets EBIT/Assets EBIT/Assets EBIT/Assets EBIT/Assets 
Sales/Assets Sales/Assets Sales/Assets Sales/Assets Sales/Assets Sales/Assets 
 Debt/Equity Debt/Equity Debt/Equity Debt/Equity Debt/Equity Debt/Equity 
Auditors Auditors Auditors Auditors Auditors Auditors 
Table 4.1: The independent variables in each of the six logit models 
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5. Data analysis 
 
5.1 Sample 
 
The empirical data for the study were collected from the Tomsonone banker database, 
which covers 493 US banks. This is a sample which consists of also bankrupt and non-
bankrupt banks. The nonfailed counterparts were selected according to two principles: 
they belonged to the same business branch and were about the same size. Data for the 
failed firms and their counterparts were for the same calendar years. The bankrupt banks 
have been affected by the financial crisis of 2007-2010 and received by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Combined, these banks held over 55 billion 
dollars in deposits, and the takeovers cost the federal government an estimated 17 
billion dollars. Only firms that met the legal definition of failure and had been trading, 
according to Altman, for 2 years prior to announcement of failure were included in the 
sample. 
Year No. of bankrupt banks Total Assets of Failed Banks 
2008 23 371,6 billion 
2009 140 125,2 billion 
2010 108 80,1  billion 
Total 271banks 576,9 billion 
Table 5.1: The amount of US bankrupt banks. Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
At first, we tried to gather a sample only of bankrupt banks but we faced the difficulty 
that the most of them were delisted and there were not any data available neither in 
Bloomberg nor in Amadeus and Bankscope.  
All the data collected were during the years 2001-2006 and consisting only US banks 
since in Europe during the financial crisis of 2008-2010 only five banks became 
insolvent because of the bankruptcy protection offered by its country‘s central bank and 
the European Central Bank. The choice of this specific date is not irrelevant because, 
according to Altman, in order to forecast a bankruptcy you need a sample of at least 6 
years and there should be two years before the bankruptcy. In Europe we observed so 
little bankruptcies because of MiFID. The Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID) as subsequently amended is a European Union law that provides 
harmonised regulation for investment services across the 30 member states of 
the European Economic Area (the 27 Member States of the European Union plus 
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Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein). The main objectives of the Directive are to 
increase competition and consumer protection in investment services. 
We use annual data in our study which may limit to distinguish the lead and the lag 
timing of crises but we do not think that we can date banking crises with such a 
precision. The main data used have been derived from the reporting financial 
statements. Since all the collected banks operated only in the United States of America, 
we have the advantage that all the reported values are in the same currency and we do 
not have to deal with foreign exchange differences. Furthermore, all the US banks 
function under the same legislation, the same set of rules and they are addressed to the 
same consumers.       
 
5.2 Variables 
 
Our objective is not simply to explain previous failures but, more importantly, to predict 
(future) failure. Variables we employed to give early warning of financial distress are 
mostly traditional financial ratios that come from financial statements such as balance 
sheets and income statements. Financial ratio analysis has been widely used to evaluate 
a firm‘s performance, to make credit risk assessment decisions, to predict bankruptcy 
and merger targets, etc. The models that we will run involve the following dependent 
and independent variable. In the following section we define each one of them 
separately in order to understand how they separately influence the performance of an 
enterprise each one of them or the combination of them and whether there is correlation 
among them. Furthermore, in section 5.2.3, we will analyze each parameter of the logit 
model which their statistical results are the evidence of this thesis.    
 
5.2.1 Dependent variable 
 
In the analysis of default probability, we are faced with a binary choice model where the 
dependent variable takes values 0 and 1. First issue to consider is that the company 
either defaults or survives in the period in which the data is taken, and second the 
default event occurs at a particular point in time. Whereas the binary random variable Y 
for the default event where Y = 0 states that the company shall never default, while Y = 
1 states that the company shall eventually default, and the probability of default is given 
by p(x) = Prob(Y = 1; x) (11). 
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5.2.2 Explanatory variables 
EBIT: Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) is the accounting measure of operating 
income from the income statement. EBIT is a measure of the profitability of the 
company. The larger the EBIT value, the more profitable the company is likely to be. 
EBIT is used by investors because the tax structure and financing structure of the 
companies being compared may be very different. These accounting techniques could 
possibly affect the final profit amount and mask the actual operating efficiency of the 
firm. EBIT is used to find the most profitable company in terms of the efficiency of its 
operation (Damodaran, 2002). 
Retained earnings: Retained earnings refer to the portion of net income which is 
retained by the corporation rather than distributed to its owners as dividends. Similarly, 
if the corporation takes a loss, then that loss is retained and called variously retained 
losses, accumulated losses or accumulated deficit. Retained earnings and losses are 
cumulative from year to year with losses offsetting earnings (Newton, 2009). 
Total Assets: Total Assets are anything tangible or intangible that is capable of being 
owned or controlled to produce value and that is held to have positive economic value is 
considered an asset. Simply stated, assets represent ownership of value that can be 
converted into cash (although cash itself is also considered an asset). The components 
of bank‘s total assets are: cash, securities, mortgages, loan, and other assets which also 
include property and equipment. It is very crucial for an investor to understand how its 
assets are invested, how much risk they are taking, and how much liquidity the bank has 
in securities as a shield against unforeseen problems. Loans represent the majority of a 
bank's assets. A bank can typically earn a higher interest rate on loans than on securities, 
however, come with risk. 
Total Liabilities: Liabilities are either the deposits of customers or money that banks 
borrow from other sources to use to fund assets that earn revenue. Deposits are like debt 
in that it is money that the banks owe to the customer but they differ from debt in that 
the addition or withdrawal of money is at the discretion of the depositor rather than 
dictated by contract. There are two types of deposits: checkable deposits a non-
transaction deposits. Checkable deposits are deposits where depositors can withdraw the 
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money at will. Nontransaction deposits include savings accounts and time deposits, 
which are basically certificates of deposits (CDs). Banks also borrow money, usually 
from other banks in what is called the federal funds market, so-called because funds 
kept in their reserve accounts at the Federal Reserve are called federal funds. Banks also 
borrow from nondepository institutions, such as insurance companies and pension funds 
(Bodie, Kane, and Marcus, 2004). 
Equity: Equity can be thought of as what the bank owes the owners. Equity equals: 
 Equity = Total Assets - Total Liabilities  (12) 
A negative equity would put bank in jeopardy of bankruptcy-on the verge of closing 
down. And if it did, depositors then run the risk of losing the financial wealth that they 
entrusted to bank for safekeeping. That is why a negative equity also attracts intense 
scrutiny from banking regulators. And that is why bank has an item called loan loss 
reserves (Bodie, Kane, and Marcus, 2009).  
Net interest margin: Net Interest Margin (NIM) shows net interest income per dollar of 
assets and is arrived at by deducting Break Even Yield from Asset Interest Yield. A 
bank‘s ability at managing interest rates is revealed by looking at NIM. If a bank is 
successful in interest rate risk management we would find the NIM would be steady 
whether the interest rates are going up or down. If NIM is shrinking this could be an 
indication of poor interest rate risk management (Murthy, 2003). 
Auditors: The auditors are the result of an internal or an external evaluation performed 
on a legal entity. Their report is given in any user as an assurance in order to take 
decisions which are based on that report. These auditing reports may concern any 
individual investor, any competitive company, the employees, the government and 
generally the public. In our sample we denote with 1 the banks which are audited by the 
auditing firms Deloite, Earnest Young, Arthur Andersa, KPMG and Price Water House 
Coopers, and all the other banks with 0. Big auditors are significantly more likely to 
give going-concern qualifications to failing companies and clean opinions to non-failing 
companies.  After controlling the differences between big and small auditors', big 
auditors give significantly more accurate reports compared to small one (Lenox, 1999). 
34 
 
                  
           
  This ratio indicates the extent to which assets have been paid for by 
company profits, which means that growth has been financed through profits, not 
increased debt. A low ratio indicates that growth may not be sustainable as it is financed 
from increasing debt, instead of reinvesting profits. 
     
           
  Asset turnover: Asset turnover is the amount of sales generated for every 
dollar's worth of assets. Asset turnover measures a firm's efficiency at using its assets in 
generating sales or revenue - the higher the number the better. It also indicates pricing 
strategy: companies with low profit margins tend to have high asset turnover, 
while those with high profit margins have low asset turnover. 
    
             Earnings before interest and taxes to total assets ratio indicates how 
productive your business's assets are.  Asset values come from earning 
power.  Therefore, whether or not liabilities exceed the true value of assets (insolvency) 
depends upon earnings generated (Murthy, 2003).   
         
      
  Debt to equity ratio: The debt-to-equity ratio (D/E) is a financial 
ratio indicating the relative proportion of shareholders' equity and debt used to finance a 
company's assets. If a lot of debt is used to finance increased operations (high debt to 
equity), the company could potentially generate more earnings than it would have 
without this outside financing. However, the cost of this debt financing may outweigh 
the return and this can lead to bankruptcy (Bodie, Kane, and Marcus, 2004).  
 
5.2.3 Model parameters 
 
Number of Observations: This is the number of observations used in the ordered logistic 
regression. It may be less than the number of cases in the dataset if there are missing 
values for some variables in the equation. In our model, the number of observations 
include the values of independent variables from 2001-2006. 
 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square (degrees of freedom):  This is the Likelihood Ratio (LR) 
Chi-Square test that at least one of the predictors' regression coefficients is not equal to 
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zero in the model. The number in the parenthesis indicates the degrees of freedom of the 
Chi-Square distribution used to test the LR Chi-Square statistic and is defined by the 
number of predictors in the model. The likelihood-ration chi-square is defined as 2(L1 - 
L0), where L0 represents the log likelihood for the "constant-only" model and L1 is the 
log likelihood for the full model with constant and predictors, where L0 (null model) is 
from the log likelihood with just the response variable in the model (Iteration 0) and L1 
(fitted model) is the log likelihood from the final iteration (assuming the model 
converged) with all the parameters. 
 
Probability > chi square: This is the probability of getting a LR test statistic as extreme 
as, or more so, than the observed under the null hypothesis; the null hypothesis is that 
all of the regression coefficients in the model are equal to zero. This p-value is 
compared to a specified alpha level, our willingness to accept a type I error, which is 
typically set at 0.05 or 0.01. The small p-value from the LR test, <0.00001, would lead 
us to conclude that at least one of the regression coefficients in the model is not equal to 
zero. The parameter of the Chi-Square distribution used to test the null hypothesis is 
defined by the degrees of freedom of the model. 
 
Pseudo R
2
: This is McFadden's pseudo R-squared. Logistic regression does not have an 
equivalent to the R-squared that is found in OLS regression; however, many people 
have tried to come up with one. Because this statistic does not mean what R-squared 
means in OLS regression (the proportion of variance for the response variable explained 
by the predictors), we suggest interpreting this statistic with great caution (Gelman, 
2009). To evaluate the goodness-of-fit of logistic models, several pseudo R-squareds 
have been developed.   These are "pseudo" R-squareds because they look like R-squared 
in the sense that they are on a similar scale, ranging from 0 to 1 (though some pseudo R-
squareds never achieve 0 or 1) with higher values indicating better model fit, but they 
cannot be interpreted as one would interpret an OLS R squared and different pseudo R-
squareds can arrive at very different values.  The pseudo-R
2
, in logistic regression, is 
defined as 
    
  
  (13), where L0 represents the log likelihood for the "constant-only" 
model and L1 is the log likelihood for the full model with constant and predictors 
(Freese, Jeremy and Long, 2006). 
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Log Likelihood: The method of maximum likelihood involves specifying the joint 
probability distribution function for the sample data. It is used in the Likelihood Ratio 
Chi-Square test of whether all predictors' regression coefficients in the model are 
simultaneously zero and in tests of nested models. Under relatively weak assumptions, 
usually called regularity conditions, maximum likelihood estimates are (a) consistent, 
(b) asymptotically normal, and (c) efficient. Consistency means that as the sample size 
increases, the maximum likelihood estimate tends in probability to the true parameter 
value. Moreover, for large sample size, the maximum likelihood estimate will have an 
approximate normal distribution centered on the true parameter value 
(http://elsa.berkeley.edu/sst/max.like.html). 
 
Independent Variables Coefficients: These are the ordered log (logit) regression 
coefficients. Standard interpretation of the ordered logit coefficient is that for a one unit 
increase in the predictor, the response variable level is expected to change by its 
respective regression coefficient in the ordered log scale while the other variables in the 
model are held constant. Interpretation of the ordered logit estimates is not dependent 
on the ancillary parameters; the ancillary parameters are used to differentiate the 
adjacent levels of the response variable. However, since the ordered logit model 
estimates one equation over all levels of the dependent variable, a concern is whether 
our one-equation model is valid or a more flexible model is required 
(http://giptsi.upf.edu/xavier/doc/stata-logistic.pdf). 
 
Standard Errors: The standard error of a method of measurement or estimation is 
the standard deviation of the sampling distribution associated with the estimation 
method. The term may also be used to refer to an estimate of that standard deviation, 
derived from a particular sample used to compute the estimate. These are the standard 
errors of the individual regression coefficients. The traditional standard error estimates 
for logistic regression models based on maximum likelihood from independent 
observations (Norton, Wang and Ai, 2004). 
 
Z-test statistic: This is the test statistic for the null hypothesis that an individual 
predictor's regression coefficient is zero given that the rest of the predictors are in the 
model. The most general way to obtain a Z-test is to define a numerical test statistic that 
can be calculated from a collection of data; such that the sampling distribution of the 
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statistic is approximately normal under the null hypothesis. The test statistic z is the 
ratio of the Coefficient to the Standard Error of the respective predictor. The z value 
follows a standard normal distribution which is used to test against a two-sided 
alternative hypothesis that the Coefficient is not equal to zero. The probability that a 
particular z test statistic is as extreme as, or more so, than what has been observed under 
the null hypothesis is defined by P>|z|. P>|z| contains the two-tail p-value for the z-test. 
 
95% Confidence Interval: This is the Confidence Interval (CI) for individual regression 
coefficients given the other predictors are in the model. For a given predictor with a 
level of 95% confidence, we would say that we are 95% confident that the "true" 
population regression coefficient lies in between the lower and upper limit of the 
interval.  It is calculated as the Coefficient ± (zα/2)*(Standard Error), where zα/2 is a 
critical value on the standard normal distribution. The CI is equivalent to the z test 
statistic: if the CI includes zero, we would fail to reject the null hypothesis that a 
particular regression coefficient is zero given the other predictors are in the model, thus 
we would accept the null hypothesis. An advantage of a CI is that it is illustrative; it 
provides a range where the "true" parameter may lie.  
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6. Logit model of Bankruptcy and Failure - Results 
 
After we run the regression in SPSS, we concluded with some logit regression results 
for various alternative specifications. Following Shumway (2001) and Chava and 
Jarrow (2004), we now estimate the probabilities of bankruptcy and failure using a logit 
model. It is important to keep in mind that we weight every firm equally. The 
distributions are dominated by the behavior of relatively small companies; value-
weighted distributions look quite different. Our results will be interpreted by the values 
of the model parameters, which are the the log likelihood of the fitted model, the 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square test, the Pseudo R square, the Standard Error, the test 
statistic z and whether the variable is statistically significant by the 95%Confidence 
Interval. We run six regressions by using different independent variables and our target 
is to point out which model interprets the bankruptcy better. In all of our models the 
number of our observations is exactly the same, 2835 observations, and the degrees of 
freedom of the Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square test is 11, since the number of the 
independent variables in all regressions is identical.  
 
6.1 Models 
 
6.1.1 Model 1 
 
 
Table 6.1: The statistical results of model 1 
We start our procedure with dependent variable the bankruptcy and as independent 
variables are Retained Earnings, Retained earnings to total assets, EBIT to total assets, 
Sales to total assets, total debt to total common equity and auditors. Moreover, we see in 
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.457426   .1657591    -8.79   0.000    -1.782308   -1.132544
       y2006     .0086511   .1670002     0.05   0.959    -.3186633    .3359656
       y2005     -.008319   .1667324    -0.05   0.960    -.3351085    .3184706
       y2003    -.0030404   .1666281    -0.02   0.985    -.3296255    .3235448
       y2002     .0031466   .1669359     0.02   0.985    -.3240418    .3303349
       y2001     .0178567   .1673926     0.11   0.915    -.3102268    .3459401
     Auditor     .1407424   .1114497     1.26   0.207     -.077695    .3591798
Tota~oEquity     .0003255   .0003307     0.98   0.325    -.0003226    .0009737
SalestoTot~s    -1.983458   .8747239    -2.27   0.023    -3.697886    -.269031
EBITtoTota~s     19.67402   6.440348     3.05   0.002     7.051173    32.29687
RetEarnin~ts    -6.541539   1.633194    -4.01   0.000    -9.742541   -3.340536
 RetEarnings    -.0000389   .0000237    -1.64   0.101    -.0000853    7.58e-06
                                                                              
  Bankruptcy        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -1366.1283                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0103
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0027
                                                  LR chi2(11)     =      28.54
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       2835
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our table that Likelihood Ratio chi
2
 is 28.54 which its value shows how well fits the 
model to bankruptcy prediction. The value of Pseudo R
2
 is equal to 0.0103, since 
Pseudo R
2
 ranges between 0 and 1 we could estimate that the model does not fit very 
well. The p-value of chi square is lower than the alpha level would lead us to conclude 
that at least one of the regression coefficients in the model is not equal to zero. Another 
important outcome that we note from the results is the coefficient for retained earnings, 
has a negative relationship with the bankruptcy. The coefficient is extremely close to 
zero, which means that there is no relation with the predictor variable.  The z test 
statistic for the predictor Retained Earnings is -1.64 with an associated p-value of 0.101. 
If we set our alpha level to 0.05, we would fail to reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that the regression coefficient for Retained Earnings has not been found to be 
statistically different from zero in estimating bankruptcy. Furthermore we observe that 
95% confidence interval for Retained Earnings is from -0.0000853 to 7.58e
-06
 
something that is obvious from the negative coefficient and it could be interpreted that it 
is not statistical significantly and retained earnings have a negative relationship with 
bankruptcy. If the sample is sufficiently large (n>100) for any sample average that we 
measure, then the true mean of the distribution will be in within that confidence interval 
95 out of 100 times (Waltz, 2003). It is conventional to create confidence intervals at 
the 95% level so this means that 95% of the time properly constructed confidence 
intervals should contain the true value of the variable of interest (Crombie, 2009).  
In the same table there is as independent variable the ratio retained earnings to total 
assets, which its 95% confidence interval is from -9.742541 to -3.340536, something 
that indicates that is statistical significant, which indicates that the statistic is reliable. 
The coefficient sign indicates that there is a negative relationship between the retained 
earnings to total assets with the bankruptcy. The z statistic is equal to -4.01 and its p-
value is zero, lower than the alpha level and we would reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that the regression coefficient for retained earnings to total assets has been 
found to be statistically different from zero in estimating bankruptcy. To continue we 
see that EBIT to total assets are also statistical significant because its 95% confidence 
interval is from 7.051173 to 32.29687 and the coefficient is positive and has a positive 
relation with our dependent variable, the bankruptcy. The p-value of z-test is lower than 
0.05, so we reject the null hypothesis. 
We continue with the ratio sales to total assets and we see that is statistical significant 
because its 95% confidence interval form -3.697886 to -0.269031 and its coefficient has 
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a negative relation with bankruptcy. The p-value of the z-test is again lower than the 
alpha level, which means that it is statically different from zero. Finally, we have total 
debt to total common equity and auditors, which are not statistical significant and 
indicates that the statistic is not reliable, because of their 95% confidence interval. Their 
coefficients are positive so they have a positive relation with the dependent variable, the 
bankruptcy.  
We should note that all the values of the coefficients in absolute values are between 0 
and 2, except from the Retained Earnings/Total assets and the EBIT/Total Assets, 
whereas in the first case is 6.54 and has negative relationship with the bankruptcy and in 
the second case is triple and equals to 19.67 with positive relationship with the 
bankruptcy. Since these variables are statistically significant, a one unit increase, the 
response variable level is expected to change dramatically. 
Due to the above table of model 1, the regression of bankruptcy prediction is the 
following: 
Bankruptcy = -1.4574 – 0.0000389 Retained Earnings – 6.5415RetainedEarn/Total 
assets + 19.674 EBIT/Total Assets – 1.9834 Sales/Total Assets + 0.00032Total 
Debt/Total Equity + 0.1407 Auditors + 0.01785 y2001+ 0.0031 y2002 -0.003 y2003 – 
0.0083 y2005 + 0.0086 y2006   (14) 
 
 
6.1.2 Model 2 
 
 
Table 6.2: The statistical results of model 2 
We now observe the second table and we see that one of the independent variable has 
changed and now is sales. Our independent variables are sales, retained earnings to total 
assets, EBIT to total assets, sales to total assets, total debt to total common equity and 
       _cons    -1.456302    .165698    -8.79   0.000    -1.781064    -1.13154
       y2006     .0109648   .1670125     0.07   0.948    -.3163737    .3383034
       y2005    -.0071891   .1667406    -0.04   0.966    -.3339946    .3196164
       y2003    -.0024057    .166628    -0.01   0.988    -.3289906    .3241791
       y2002     .0052602   .1669404     0.03   0.975     -.321937    .3324575
       y2001     .0220507   .1673912     0.13   0.895      -.30603    .3501314
     Auditor     .1421909   .1113875     1.28   0.202    -.0761247    .3605064
Tota~oEquity      .000335    .000331     1.01   0.311    -.0003137    .0009836
SalestoTot~s    -2.000785   .8727045    -2.29   0.022    -3.711254   -.2903157
EBITtoTota~s     19.68728   6.439645     3.06   0.002     7.065806    32.30875
RetEarnin~ts    -6.618756   1.631802    -4.06   0.000    -9.817029   -3.420483
       Sales    -.0000314   .0000191    -1.65   0.099    -.0000688    5.96e-06
                                                                              
  Bankruptcy        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -1365.8899                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0105
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0023
                                                  LR chi2(11)     =      29.02
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       2835
41 
 
auditor. We note that now Pseudo R
2
 is a little higher from the first regression and equal 
to 0.0105, though there is an improvement to that fit measure. We can also assume that 
LR chi
2
 outcome in this regression is quite higher, is 29.02, so the model fits better for 
the bankruptcy prediction. 
In this table we see that for sales the 95% confidence interval is from -0.0000688 to 
5.96e
-06
, all the values are between the confidence limits, which indicates that it is not 
statistical significant, so the statistic is not reliable. The coefficient is negative, 
something that show us the negative relation of sale with the bankruptcy. The p-value of 
z statistic exceeds the alpha level, though we would fail to reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that the regression coefficient for sales has not been found to be statistically 
different from zero in estimating bankruptcy. 
On the other hand, retained earnings to total assets are statistical significant, so the 
statistic is reliable because their 95% confidence interval is -9.817029 to -3.420483, and 
the coefficient is negative and equals to -6,61, consequently there is a negative relation 
with the bankruptcy. The p-value is zero and for that reason we reject the null 
hypothesis. We continue with EBIT to total assets, where the 95% confidence interval is 
from 7.065806 to 32.30875 and because of its confidence limits, is statistical significant 
and since the coefficient is positive, it is obvious that there is a positive relation with the 
bankruptcy. We should note that EBIT to total assets in both models so far, has exactly 
the same value, which means that in both cases they influence bankruptcy in the same 
manner.  
Continuing, we observe sales to total assets and we note from its 95% confidence 
interval that it is statistical significant. Its coefficient is negative, so we see that there is 
a negative relation between sales to total assets and bankruptcy. This indicator affects 
bankruptcy more than in the previous model, since the value of the coefficient is higher. 
The p-value is equal to 0,022, so we do not accept the null hypothesis. 
Finally, we see total debt to total common equity and auditors, which are not statistical 
significant because their 95% confidence intervals, so the statistics are not reliable. 
Their coefficients are positive, so we can say that both have a positive relation with the 
bankruptcy. 
Due to the above table of model 2, the regression of bankruptcy prediction is the 
following: 
Bankruptcy = -1.4563 – 0.0000314Sales – 6.6187RetainedEarn/Total assets + 19.687 
EBIT/Total Assets – 2.000 Sales/Total Assets + 0.000335Total Debt/Total Equity + 
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0.1421 Auditors + 0.0220 y2001+ 0.0052 y2002 -0.0024 y2003 – 0.0071 y2005 + 
0.0109 y2006    (15) 
 
 
6.1.3 Model 3 
 
 
Table 6.3: The statistical results of model 3 
We proceed to the third logistic regression, in which we change our first independent 
variable from sales, in model 2, to EBIT. Our independent variables are EBIT, retained 
earnings to total assets, EBIT to total assets, sales to total assets, totals debt to total 
common equity and auditor. We observe that Pseudo R
2
 is lower from the other two 
regressions and is 0.0098, which is not an expected outcome. The third model does not 
fit well to the bankruptcy prediction something that is observed also from the LR chi
2
 
which is lower than the other two regressions and equals to 27.03.  
EBIT is not statistical significant because of its 95% confidence interval. Its coefficient, 
again, is very close to zero, which means that this variable is not important since any 
change in its value would not affect the dependent variable.  
On the other hand, retained earnings to total assets are statistical significant because 
their 95% confidence interval is – 9.869238 to -3.469707 and the coefficient is also 
negative, so we have a negative relation again with the bankruptcy. Its p-value is higher 
than alpha level and we accept the null hypothesis. 
We continue with EBIT to total assets and is statistical significant, so we see that the 
statistic is reliable but with positive coefficient, which indicates the positive relation 
with bankruptcy. Again, the coefficient values of retained earnings to total assets and 
EBIT to total assets do not fluctuate from the two previous models and are 
. 
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.454911   .1657363    -8.78   0.000    -1.779748   -1.130074
       y2006     .0094551   .1669708     0.06   0.955    -.3178017     .336712
       y2005    -.0076764   .1666972    -0.05   0.963    -.3343968     .319044
       y2003    -.0024379   .1665884    -0.01   0.988    -.3289452    .3240694
       y2002     .0039466   .1668895     0.02   0.981    -.3231509    .3310441
       y2001      .019738   .1673495     0.12   0.906    -.3082609    .3477369
     Auditor     .1291218   .1112642     1.16   0.246     -.088952    .3471955
Tota~oEquity     .0003161    .000331     0.96   0.340    -.0003326    .0009648
SalestoTot~s    -2.025648   .8767419    -2.31   0.021     -3.74403   -.3072651
EBITtoTota~s     20.00941   6.451239     3.10   0.002     7.365211     32.6536
RetEarnin~ts    -6.669473   1.632563    -4.09   0.000    -9.869238   -3.469707
        EBIT    -.0000659   .0000483    -1.36   0.173    -.0001606    .0000288
                                                                              
  Bankruptcy        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  -1366.883                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0098
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0045
                                                  LR chi2(11)     =      27.03
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       2835
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approximately the same. Until now, we could assume that the three models have the 
same characteristics as well as almost the same values.  
We also see sales to total assets that are also statistical significant because its confidence 
interval is -3.74403 to-0.3072651 and its coefficient value of -2.02 indicates its negative 
relation with the bankruptcy. Its p-value is under the limit of 0.05, which means that the 
null hypothesis can be rejected. 
Finally, we see total debt to common equity and auditors which are not statistical 
significant, something that derives from their 95% confidence interval, which is -
0.0003326 to 0.0009648 for the first and -0.088952 to 0.3471955 for the second one and 
we notice that their values do not lie between the confidence limits. Their coefficients 
are positive, so we observe a positive relation with the bankruptcy. 
The regression of bankruptcy prediction of model 3 is the following: 
Bankruptcy = -1.4546 – 0.0000659 EBIT – 6.6694 Retained Earnings/Total assets + 
20.0094 EBIT/Total Assets – 2.0256 Sales/Total Assets + 0.000316 Total Debt/Total 
Equity + 0.1291 Auditors + 0.0197 y2001+ 0.0039 y2002 -0.0024 y2003 – 0.0076 
y2005 + 0.0094 y2006    (16) 
 
6.1.4 Model 4 
 
Table 6.4: The statistical results of model 4 
In our fourth regression, we have also changed the independent variable with the ratio 
Total Liabilities to total assets and our independent variables are now total liabilities to 
total assets, retained earnings to total assets, EBIT to total assets, sales to totals assets, 
total debt to total common equity and auditor.  
We observe that Pseudo R
2
, the goodness of fit measure, equals to 0.0104 and is higher 
from third and first but lower from the second model. The LR chi
2
 which indicates how 
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.451668   .1655914    -8.77   0.000    -1.776221   -1.127115
       y2006      .008341   .1670006     0.05   0.960    -.3189741    .3356561
       y2005     -.008295   .1667356    -0.05   0.960    -.3350909    .3185008
       y2003    -.0033201   .1666279    -0.02   0.984    -.3299048    .3232646
       y2002     .0033826   .1669386     0.02   0.984    -.3238111    .3305763
       y2001     .0188258   .1673849     0.11   0.910    -.3092426    .3468941
     Auditor     .1392074   .1113152     1.25   0.211    -.0789664    .3573812
Tota~oEquity     .0003363   .0003312     1.02   0.310    -.0003129    .0009854
SalestoTot~s    -2.008591   .8739617    -2.30   0.022    -3.721524   -.2956574
EBITtoTota~s     19.57047   6.435664     3.04   0.002     6.956805    32.18414
RetEarnin~ts    -6.632997     1.6317    -4.07   0.000     -9.83107   -3.434923
TotalLiabi~s    -2.29e-06   1.46e-06    -1.58   0.115    -5.15e-06    5.60e-07
                                                                              
  Bankruptcy        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -1366.0562                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0104
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0025
                                                  LR chi2(11)     =      28.68
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       2835
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well fits the model to the bankruptcy prediction is higher from the third and first 
regression but lower from the second one and is equal to 28.68. These results represent 
that Pseudo R
2
 percentage explains the model in a better way than first and third model 
but not from the second one and also the value of LR chi
2
 shows that the model fits 
better for the bankruptcy prediction from first and third but not from the second one 
again. In other words, the second model so far has better predictive capacity.  
We can also observe that total liabilities to total assets are not statistical significant 
because its 95% confidence interval is between -5.15e
-06
 to 5.60e
-07
. Additively, its 
coefficient is negative, something that indicates the negative relation with the 
bankruptcy. The p-value is above the confidence level of 0.05 we would fail to reject 
the null hypothesis and conclude that the regression coefficient for total liabilities to 
total assets has not been found to be statistically different from zero in 
estimating bankruptcy.  
As far as the second independent variable, which is retained earnings to total assets and 
we can see from its 95% confidence interval that is statistical significant, so the statistic 
is reliable. Its 95% confidence interval is between -9.83107 and -3.434923 and its 
coefficient is also negative as before. The null hypothesis is rejected as well according 
to the p-value. 
We move to the third variable of this model, EBIT to total assets and we see that is 
statistical significant because its 95% confidence interval is between 6.956805 and 
32.18414 and this ratio is related positively with the bankruptcy. Again, the value of the 
coefficient is approximately 20, which indicates how much this ratio affects the 
possibility of a bankruptcy. 
The next variable is sales to total assets and is also statistical significant for the same 
reason. Its 95% confidence interval is from-3.721524 to -02956574 but its coefficient is 
negative, so we have a negative relation with the dependent variable.  
Finally, we have total debt to total common equity and auditors and again both of them 
are not statistically significant. Their coefficients are positive, so we have a positive 
relation with bankruptcy for both of them. 
The final form of bankruptcy prediction of model 4 is: 
Bankruptcy = -1.4516 – 2.29e-06 Total Liabilities/Total assets – 6.6329 Retained 
Earnings/Total assets + 19.5704 EBIT/Total Assets – 2.0085 Sales/Total Assets + 
0.000336 Total Debt/Total Equity + 0.1392 Auditors + 0.0188 y2001+ 0.0033 y2002 -
0.0033 y2003 – 0.0082 y2005 + 0.0083 y2006   (17) 
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6.1.5 Model 5 
 
 
Table 6.5: The statistical results of model 5 
Two steps before end, our results are represented in another table, table number five 
where the independent variable is now total assets and Pseudo R
2
 is the same as table 
four, 0.0104 and LR chi2 is almost the same, 28.80. Since the results are quite the same; 
the two regressions are almost equal.  
In this table total assets are not statistical significant because the values of the 95% 
confidence interval lies between their confidence limits, which is between -4.18e
-06
 and 
5.03e
-07
. The coefficient is negative so we observe a negative relation with the 
dependent variable which is bankruptcy, which is a very logical assumption since the 
more assets, the less bankruptcies. The p-value, one more time in our first variable, 
exceeds the alpha level and for that reason we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
The second independent variable is retained earnings to total assets and is statistical 
significant because its 95% confidence intervals from -9.829812 to -3.433786 and its 
coefficient is also negative as before. We continue with EBIT to total assets which 
according to its 95% confidence, from 6.969625 to 32.19967 interval is statistical 
significant, so the statistic is reliable. The coefficient of this variable is positive so we 
can assume that we have a positive relation with the bankruptcy. The next independent 
variable is sales to total assets and we can see again from its 95% confidence interval, 
from -3.721302 to -0.2953439, that is statistical significant. Its coefficient is negative, 
something that indicates the negative relation with the dependent variable. In all these 
variables, the p-value is lower than the alpha level and consequently we reject the null 
hypothesis. 
                                                                              
       _cons     -1.45187   .1656001    -8.77   0.000    -1.776441     -1.1273
       y2006     .0084509   .1670039     0.05   0.960    -.3188708    .3357726
       y2005    -.0082876   .1667387    -0.05   0.960    -.3350894    .3185142
       y2003    -.0034373   .1666303    -0.02   0.984    -.3300267    .3231521
       y2002     .0032713   .1669413     0.02   0.984    -.3239275    .3304702
       y2001     .0186711   .1673879     0.11   0.911    -.3094032    .3467454
     Auditor     .1402754   .1113666     1.26   0.208    -.0779992      .35855
Tota~oEquity     .0003362   .0003311     1.02   0.310    -.0003129    .0009852
SalestoTot~s    -2.008323    .873985    -2.30   0.022    -3.721302   -.2953439
EBITtoTota~s     19.58465   6.436355     3.04   0.002     6.969625    32.19967
RetEarnin~ts    -6.631799   1.631669    -4.06   0.000    -9.829812   -3.433786
 TotalAssets    -2.15e-06   1.36e-06    -1.59   0.112    -4.81e-06    5.03e-07
                                                                              
  Bankruptcy        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -1365.9983                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0104
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0024
                                                  LR chi2(11)     =      28.80
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       2835
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Finally, there are the ratio total debt to total common equity and auditors, which are not 
statistical significant, so the statistic is not reliable, as we can see from their 95% 
confidence interval, -0.0003129 to 0.0009852 for the first and -0.0779992 to 0.35855 
for the second one. The coefficients are positive so we have a positive relation for both 
of them with bankruptcy. 
The final form of bankruptcy prediction of model 5 is the following equation: 
Bankruptcy = -1.4518 – 2.15e-06 Total assets – 6.6317 Retained Earnings/Total assets + 
19.5846 EBIT/Total Assets – 2.0083 Sales/Total Assets + 0.000336 Total Debt/Total 
Equity + 0.1402 Auditors + 0.0186 y2001+ 0.0032 y2002 -0.0034 y2003 – 0.0082 
y2005 + 0.0084 y2006   (18) 
 
6.1.6 Model 6 
 
 
Table 6.6: The statistical results of model 6 
We continue with our last model where we replace the first independent variable with 
the total debt. We observe the lowest Pseudo R
2
, 0.0096, which means that this 
percentage do not explain the model very well and the lowest chi
2
, 26.40 which shows 
us that the model does not fit well to the bankruptcy prediction.  
Someone would except that the sign of the total debt would be positive, on the contrary 
though, its coefficient is negative which shows us a negative relation with the 
bankruptcy. This outcome generates many questions, since the literature review has 
proved that total debt is extremely correlated with the bankruptcy and the higher debt, 
the more possible a bankruptcy to happen. In this table, we assume that total debt is not 
statistical significant because its 95% confidence interval is between -0.0000115 and 
2.87e
-06
 and the values do not lie between confidence limits.  The second variable is 
                                                                              
       _cons     -1.44864   .1655169    -8.75   0.000    -1.773048   -1.124233
       y2006      .007427    .166945     0.04   0.965    -.3197792    .3346332
       y2005    -.0086571   .1666771    -0.05   0.959    -.3353382    .3180241
       y2003    -.0028707   .1665693    -0.02   0.986    -.3293406    .3235992
       y2002      .004128   .1668806     0.02   0.980     -.322952     .331208
       y2001     .0205096   .1673308     0.12   0.902    -.3074526    .3484719
     Auditor     .1196483   .1106836     1.08   0.280    -.0972877    .3365843
Tota~oEquity     .0003265   .0003324     0.98   0.326     -.000325    .0009781
SalestoTot~s     -2.02406   .8757302    -2.31   0.021     -3.74046   -.3076608
EBITtoTota~s     19.55874   6.434035     3.04   0.002     6.948261    32.16922
RetEarnin~ts    -6.674833   1.632958    -4.09   0.000    -9.875371   -3.474294
   TotalDebt    -4.33e-06   3.67e-06    -1.18   0.238    -.0000115    2.87e-06
                                                                              
  Bankruptcy        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -1367.1998                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0096
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0057
                                                  LR chi2(11)     =      26.40
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       2835
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retained earnings to total assets which are statistical significant something that is 
derived from its 95% confidence interval which is between -9.875371 and -3.474294 a 
note that indicates that the statistic is reliable. Its coefficient is negative again as before.  
We continue with EBIT to total assets where we have a 95% confidence interval from 
6.948261 to 32.16922, which indicates that is statistical significant and a positive 
coefficient, which show us the positive relation with the dependent variable. The fourth 
variable is sales to total assets and is also statistical significant as we can see from its 
95% confidence interval. -3.7406 to -0.3076608, and its coefficient is negative so we 
have a negative relation with bankruptcy.  
Finally, we have total debt to total common equity and auditors, which are not statistical 
significant as their 95% confidence interval indicate -0.000325 to 0.0009781 for the 
first and -0.0972877 to 0.3365843 for the second one, while their values do not lie 
between the limits of the confidence. Their coefficients are positive, so we observe that 
they both have a positive relation with the bankruptcy. 
Due to the above table of model 6, the regression of bankruptcy prediction is the 
following: 
Bankruptcy = -1.4486 – 4.33e-06 Total Debt – 6.6748 Retained Earnings/Total assets + 
19.5587 EBIT/Total Assets – 2.024 Sales/Total Assets + 0.000332 Total Debt/Total 
Equity + 0.1196 Auditors + 0.0205 y2001+ 0.0041 y2002 -0.0028 y2003 – 0.0074 
y2005 + 0.0074 y2006   (19) 
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6.2 Result Discussion 
 
We use a set of accounting ratios, which are commonly used in the assessment of bank 
financial health and can be grouped into four categories, asset quality, earnings and 
liquidity. We first consider order differences of these ratios as explanatory variables 
which seems preferable to the use of ratios (Distinguin, Tarazi and Trinidad, 2010). We 
aim to predict changes in the financial condition of the bank not its financial condition 
and the important in our study is that requires equal consideration of banks regardless of 
the initial financial strength. More accurate the downgrade of a safe bank as compared 
to a modestly performing bank can only be captured by a change in the values of ratios 
of this bank. (Distinguin, Tarazi and Trinidad, 2010).  
In our study, we have already mentioned that we run six different regressions, changing 
every time the independent variable. Our purpose was to distinguish which variable is 
statistically significant for the bankruptcy and how one degree of change, affects the 
responsive variable, held all the other variables constant. Unfortunately, due to our 
results, all the first independent variables were statistically insignificant, plus the value 
of their coefficients in all the models was approximately zero, which means that there is 
no relation between the dependent and the independent variables. Furthermore, in 
models 3 and 6, where the independent variables were the total liabilities/total assets 
and total debt respectively, their coefficients were negative which indicates negative 
relation with the bankruptcy. This assumption contracts the theories firstly written by 
Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968), who emphasized that liabilities and debt are the best 
bankruptcy predictors. Financing total assets (to a great degree) through liabilities is 
often reported as a signal of financial distress (Charalampidis and Papadopoulos. 2009).  
From the six models that we run, we concluded that model 2, where the changed 
independent variable is sales, presents better statistical results. We have chosen the 
second one because it has the highest pseudo R
2
. Another serious reason for choosing 
the second model is because of its better maximum log likelihood result. Maximum 
Likelihood estimation is attractive because is simple and receives an intuitive 
interpretation. Furthermore, we can see that LR chi
2
 of the second regression is the 
highest of the six. Chi
2
 show us how well fits the model for the bankruptcy prediction, 
and in this model fits better than any other.  
In our study with the logit analysis model the statistical significance of ratios‘ 
coefficient is based on whether the p-value < 0.05. If this happens then the coefficient is 
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statistically significant and the relation between each ratio and bankruptcy increases on 
the values of the independent variable and lead to increases on the probability P and 
vice versa (Charalampidis and Papadopoulos. 2009). 
We observed that sales are not statistical significant and have a negative relation with 
the dependent variable, the bankruptcy. This is a rational outcome because the returns 
generated on sales and investment indicates profitability and profitability and 
bankruptcy are reversely proportionally (Helfert, 1991). One way to deal with financial 
distress is to generate sufficient cash through asset sales to meet debt obligations and 
allow a firm to avoid both indirect and direct distress costs. 
Continuing, the ratio retained earnings to total assets is the second indicator of our 
model. This ratio is likely low for new firms and designates cumulative profitability. 
Indeed, businesses less than three years old fail most frequently. We can see its negative 
relation with bankruptcy something that portends cloudy skies. However, results can be 
distorted by manipulated retained earnings (earned surplus) data. 
On the other hand, from our second regression, we observe a positive relation between 
EBIT to total assets and financial distress is not reasonable because high values of EBIT 
to total assets show an effective use of total assets, assuming that profits before income 
taxes (interest expenses) are a good approximation of equity return (debt return). The 
predicted relation between profitability and the probability of default should be 
negative. The two measures of profitability used in past studies are the ratio of earnings 
before interest and taxes to book assets, (Altman, 1968), and net income to book assets, 
(Zmijewski (1984), Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2004)). Except from the 
positive relation, the coefficient is equal 19.68 which mean that an increase of 1 unit of 
EBIT to total assets will increase bankruptcy twenty times. However, EBIT to total 
assets measures the total return on assets ignoring the particular returns on equity and 
debt and as a result EBIT to total assets takes the same value for a firm with profits 
before income taxes (Charalampidis & Papadopoulos. 2009).  
Moreover, in our second regression we observe the ratio of sales to total assets. On the 
other hand, when viewed alongside retained earnings to total assets  and EBIT to total 
assets and sales to total assets, it can confirm whether your business is in imminent 
danger. Furthermore, these three ratios are part of the Altman z-score which was 
introduced in 1968, whereas retained earnings to total assets given the heaviest weight. 
A higher Z-score should in principle mean a lower probability of insolvency. 
Surprisingly, solvent firms have significantly lower sales-to-assets ratios than firms that 
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are about to default, inconsistent with the argument that one of the indirect costs of 
financial distress is firms‘ decreased ability to compete markets (Opler and Titman. 
1994). This result is perhaps due to the accumulation of losses by distressed firms, as 
suggested by Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008). Solvent firms are typically older 
than firms that are about to go bankrupt, consistent with Shumway‘s (2001) assertion, 
and have higher market values than bankrupt firms. 
Another ratio which is included in our model is debt to equity ratio. The relation 
between leverage and the probability of default is predicted to be positive. Similar to 
Zmijewski (1984), Shumway (2001), and Chava and Jarrow (2004), among others we 
use the debt to equity ratio. The same financial ratio used by Beaver (1966), which in 
his study had the third best classifying ability, misclassified 19 and 32 percent, 
respectively, of the companies one and three years, respectively, before failure. Our 
results showed that this variable was not statistically significant; nevertheless leverage 
is the most significant factor of bankruptcy prediction.  
Finally, our last independent variable, the auditors, we can say that in a bankruptcy 
model shows that large auditors' reports are significantly more accurate indicators of 
financial distress compared to small auditors' reports. The main difficulty in measuring 
the accuracy of audit reports is that one does not directly observe whether companies 
deserve clean or qualified audit opinions. If audit reports are affected by factors other 
than the probability of bankruptcy, one might expect audit reports to be less accurate 
than the model (Lenox. 1999). In our model, auditors as a variable were statistically 
insignificant.  
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7. Conclusions 
 
In this study we have explored the bankruptcy prediction of the US banks and to 
examine whether the financial crisis that we are being through could be forecasted it. 
The empirical data for the study were collected from the Tomsonone banker database, 
which covers 493 US banks. This was a sample which consists of also bankrupt and 
non-bankrupt banks. All the data collected were during the years 2001-2006.  
Our objective is not simply to explain previous failures but more importantly to predict 
(future) failure. Variables we employed to give early warning of financial distress are 
mostly traditional financial ratios that come from financial statements such as balance 
sheets and income statements. The dependent variable was the in the analysis of default 
probability, we were faced with a binary choice model where the dependent variable 
takes values 0 and 1, 0 when the bank was healthy and 1 when was bankrupt. Our 
independent variables were sales, EBIT, total assets, total liabilities to total assets, total 
debt, retained earnings, retained earnings to total assets, EBIT to total assets, sales to 
total assets, total debt to total common equity and auditor. 
We run six different logit models, in which some indicators were used in all of them 
because of their statistical significance. In each model we changed variables to 
distinguish how this change would affect the probability of default. According to 
statistical measures we concluded that bankruptcy could be better forecasted with 
following variables: sales, retained earnings to total assets, EBIT to total assets, sales to 
total assets, total debt to total common equity and auditor. The results documented that 
both profitability and leverage ratio explain the event of bankruptcy.  
The limitations of this paper extended to those associated with the issue of data, which 
led to a limited sample of banks due to the fact that the data of many bankrupt banks 
were delisted. If the proportion of bankrupt to nonbankrupt banks were different we 
estimate that the results might be different. Furthermore, our sample was constructed 
only with US banks. If we used a global sample, it would be more representative 
concerning the global financial crisis and it would lead to more informative results. This 
statement could become real with a new study in which we would select a bigger global 
sample and also more financial indicators. 
A possible extension of the present study is the estimation of the models‘ predictive 
accuracy using data from a future period of time, with global and extended sample. 
Moreover, it would be very interesting to proceed into a comparative analysis by using, 
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except from the logit, regression other models which were referred to the literature 
review and to compare their results. Since, the financial crisis is still ongoing we would 
have the opportunity to present a study, in which we would present a comparative 
analysis among different methodologies referring to the bankruptcy prediction.    
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Appendix  
 
 Table 1: US Bankrupt and Nonbankrupt banks of the sample 
 
US Banks of the sample 
1st Centennial Bancorp Heritage Commerce Corp. 
1st Constitution Bancorporation Heritage Oaks Bancorp 
1st Source Corp. HF Financial Corp. 
Abigail Adams National Bancorp Highlands Bankshares Inc 
Acnb Corp. Hingham Institution For Savings 
AJS Bancorp Inc HMN Financial Inc 
Alaska Pacific Bancshares Inc Hopfed Bancorp Inc 
Alliance Bancorp Inc Of (Pennsylvania) Horizon Bancorp 
Alliance Financial Corp. Horizon Bancorporation Inc 
AMB Financial Corp. Hudson City Bancorp Inc 
Amcore Financial Inc Huntington Bancshares Inc 
Ameriana Bancorp Iberiabank Corp. 
American National Bankshares Inc Imperial Capital Bancorp Inc 
American River Bankshares Independence Federal Savings Bank 
American West Bancorporation Independent Bank Corp. 
Americasbank Corp. Indiana Community Bancorp 
Ameris Bancorp Indymac Bancorp Inc 
Ameriserv Financial Inc International Bancshares Corp. 
Anchor Bancorp Wisconsin Inc Intervest Bancshares Corp. 
Annapolis Bancorp Inc Irwin Financial Corp. 
Appalachian Bancshares Inc Jacksonville Bancorp Inc 
Apple Valley Bank Trust Co (The) Jacksonville Bancorp Inc Florida 
Arrow Financial Corp. Jefferson Bancshares Inc 
Atlantic Bancgroup Inc Jeffersonville Bancorp 
Auburn National Bancorporation Inc Jesup & Lamont Inc 
Bancfirst Corp. JP Morgan Chase & Company 
Bancorp Rhode Island Inc Juniata Valley Financial Corp. 
Bancorpsouth Inc Lakeland Bancorp Inc 
Banctrust Financial Group Inc Lakeland Financial Corp. 
Bank Mutual Corp. Landmark Bancorp Inc 
Bank Of America Corp. Lcnb Corp. 
Bank Of Commerce Holdings Legacy Bancorp Inc 
Bank Of Florida Corp. Lifestore Financial Group 
Bank Of Hawaii Corp. LNB Bancorporation Inc 
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Bank Of Kentucky Financial Corp. LSB Corp. 
Bank Of McKenney VA LSB Financial Corp. 
Bank Of New York Mellon Corp. M & T Bank Corp. 
BANK OF OAK RIDGE Macatawa Bank Corp. 
Bank Of The Ozarks Inc Mackinac Financial Corp. 
Bankatlantic Bancorp Inc Mainsource Financial Group Inc 
Bankfinancial Corp. Mainstreet Bankshares Inc 
Bankunited Financial Corp. Marshall & Ilsley Corp. 
Banner Corp. Mayflower Bancorp Inc 
Bar Harbor Bankshares MB Financial Inc 
Bay Banks Of Virginia Inc MBT Financial Corp. 
Baylake Corp. Mercantile Bank Corp. 
BB & T Corp. Merchants Bancshares Inc 
Berkshire Bancorp Inc Meta Financial Group Inc 
Berkshire Hills Bancorp Inc Metro Bancorp Inc 
Beverly Hills Bancorp Inc Metrocorp Bancshares Inc 
Beverly National Corp. Mid Penn Bancorp Inc 
Blue Valley Ban Corp. Mid-Wisconsin Financial Services Inc 
BNC Bancorp Middleburg Financial Corp. 
Bok Financial Corp. Midwest Banc Holdings Inc 
BOL Bancshares Inc Millennium Bankshares Corp. 
Boston Private Financial Holdings Inc Monarch Community Bancorp Inc 
Botetourt Bankshares Inc Monroe Bancorporation 
Bridge Bancorp Inc Nara Bancorp Inc 
Bridge Capital Holdings Nasb Financial Inc 
Brookline Bancorp Inc National Bancshares Corp. 
Bryn Mawr Bank Corp. NB & T Financial Group Inc 
C & F Financial Corp. NBT Bancorp Inc 
Cadence Financial Corp. New Century Bancorp Inc 
Camco Financial Corp. New Hampshire Thrift Bancshares Inc 
Camden National Corp. New York Community Bancorp Inc 
Canandaigua National Corp. Newbridge Bancorp 
Cape Fear Bank Corp. Newnan Coweta Bancshares Inc 
Capital Bank Corp. North State Bankcorp 
Capital City Bank Group Inc Northeast Bancorp 
Capital Corp. Of The West Northern Trust Corp. 
Carolina Trust Bank Northrim Bancorp Inc 
Carrollton Bancorp Northwest Bancshares Inc 
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Carver Bancorp Inc Northwest Indiana Bancorporation 
Cascade Bancorp Norwood Financial Corp. 
Cascade Financial Corp. Oak Financial Corp. 
Cathay General Bancorp Oceanfirst Financial Corp. 
CCF Holding Company Ocwen Financial Corp. 
Ccfnb Bancorp Inc Ohio Legacy Corp. 
Cecil Bancorp Inc Ohio Valley Banc Corp. 
Center Bancorp Inc Old Line Bancshares Inc 
Center Financial Corp. Old Point Financial Corp. 
Centerstate Banks Inc Old Second Bancorp Inc 
Central Bancorp Inc Oneida Financial Corp. 
Central Federal Corp. Optimumbank Holdings Inc 
Central Jersey Bancorp Orrstown Financial Services Inc 
Central Pacific Financial Corp. PAB Bankshares Inc 
Central Valley Community Bancorp Pacific Capital Bancorp 
Central Virginia Bankshares Inc Pacific Continental Corp. 
Centrue Financial Corp. Pacific Financial Corp. 
Century Bancorp Inc Pacific Mercantile Bancorporation 
CFS Bancorp Inc Pacific Premier Bancorp Inc 
Chemical Financial Corp. Pacific State Bancorp 
Chemung Financial Corp. Pacwest Bancorp 
Cheviot Financial Corp. Pamrapo Bancorporation Inc 
Choiceone Financial Services Inc Park Bancorp Inc 
Citigroup Inc Park National Corp. 
Citizens & Northern Corp. Parke Bancorp Inc 
Citizens Bancshares Corp. Parkvale Financial Corp. 
Citizens Financial Corp. (WV) Parkway Bank 
Citizens Financial Services Inc Patapsco Bancorp Inc 
Citizens Republic Bancorp Inc Pathfinder Bancorp Inc 
Citizens South Banking Corp. Patriot National Bancorporation Inc 
City Bank Peapack-Gladstone Financial 
City Holding Company Penns Woods Bancorp Inc 
City National Corp. Penseco Financial Services Corp. 
CNB Corp. Peoples Bancorporation Inc 
CNB Financial Corp. Peoples Community Bancorp Inc 
Coast Bancorp Peoples Financial Services Corp. 
Coastal Banking Company Inc Peoples United Financial Inc 
Cobiz Financial Inc Peoples-Sidney Financial Corp 
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Codorus Valley Bancorp Inc PFF Bancorp Inc 
Colony Bankcorp Inc Pioneer Bankshares Inc 
Columbia Bancorp Plumas Bancorp 
Columbia Banking Systems Inc PNC Financial Services Group Inc 
Comerica Inc Popular Inc 
Comm Bancorp Inc Potomac Bancshares Inc 
Commerce Bancshares Inc Premier Financial Bancorp Inc 
Commercefirst Bancorp Inc Premier Service Bank 
Commercial Bancshares Inc Premier West Bancorp 
Commercial National Financial Corp. Princeton National Bancorp Inc 
Commonwealth Bankshares Inc Privatebancorp Inc 
Community Bancorp Provident Community Bancshares Inc 
Community Bank Shares Of Indiana Provident Financial Holdings Inc 
Community Bank System Inc Provident Financial Services Inc 
Community Capital Bancshares Inc Provident New York Bancorp 
Community Capital Corp. Pulaski Financial Corp. 
Community Central Bank Corp. QCR Holdings Inc 
Community First Bancorporation QNB Corp. 
Community Shores Bank Corp. Regions Financial Corp. 
Community Trust Bancorp Inc Renasant Corp. 
Community Valley Bancorp Republic Bancorp Inc 
Community West Bancshares REPUBLIC FIRST BANCORP. INC. 
Consumers Bancorp Inc River Valley Bancorp 
Cooperative Bankshares Inc Riverview Bancorp Inc 
Cornerstone Bancshares Inc Roebling Financial Corp. Inc 
Cortland Bancorp Rome Bancorp Inc 
Corus Bankshares Inc Royal Bancshares Of Pennsylvania Inc 
Cowlitz Bancorporation Rurban Financial Corp. 
Crescent Banking Company S & T Bancorp Inc 
Croghan Bancshares Inc Salisbury Bancorp Inc 
CSB Bancorp Inc San Joaquin Bancorp 
Cullen Frost Bankers Inc Sandy Spring Bancorp Inc 
DCB Financial Corp. Santander Bancorp 
Dime Community Bancshares Inc Scbt Financial Corp. 
Dimeco Inc Seacoast Banking Corp. Florida 
DNB Financial Corp. Security Bank Corp. 
DOWNEY FINANCIAL CORP. Security Federal Corp. 
Eagle Bancorp Inc Severn Bancorp Inc 
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EAGLE FINANCIAL CORP. Shore Bancshares Inc 
East West Bancorp Inc Sierra Bancorp 
Eastern Virginia Bankshares Inc Simmons First National Corp. 
ECB Bancorp Inc Smithtown Bancorp Inc 
Elmira Savings Bank FSB (The) Somerset Hills Bancorp 
Emclaire Financial Corp. Sonoma Valley Bancorp 
Enterprise Bancorp Inc South Financial Group Inc 
Enterprise Financial Services Corp. Southeastern Bank Financial Corp. 
ESB Financial Corp. Southeastern Banking Darien 
Evergreen Bancorp Inc Southern Community Bancshares Inc GA 
F & M Bank Corp. Southern Community Financial Corp. 
Farmers & Merchants Bancorp Inc Southern Connecticut Bancorporation Inc 
Farmers & Merchants Bank Southern Missouri Bancorp Inc 
Farmers Capital Bank Corp. Southside Bancshares Inc 
FARMERS NATIONAL BANCORP Southwest Georgia Financial Corp. 
Fauquier Bankshares Inc Stellarone Corp. 
FEDERAL TRUST CORPORATION Sterling Bancorp 
Fentura Financial Inc Sterling Bancshares Inc 
FFD Financial Corp. Sterling Financial Corp. 
Fidelity Bancorporation Inc Suffolk Bancorp 
Fidelity D & D Bancorp Inc Summit Financial Group Inc 
Fidelity Southern Corp. Suntrust Banks Inc 
Fifth Third Bancorp Sunwest Bank 
Financial Institutions Inc Susquehanna Bancshares Inc 
First Bancorp Sussex Bancorp 
First Bancshares Inc SVB Financial Group 
First Bancshares Inc MS SY Bancorp Inc 
First Banctrust Corp. Synovus Financial Corp. 
First Busey Corp. Tamalpais Bancorp 
First Capital Inc Taylor Capital Group Inc 
First Chester County Corp. TCF Financial Corp. 
First Citizens Banc Corp. Team Financial Inc 
First Citizens Bancshares Inc Teche Holding Company 
First Citizens Bancshares Inc Temecula Valley Bancorp Inc 
First Commonwealth Financial Corp TF Financial Corp. 
First Defiance Financial Corp. The First Bancorp Inc 
First Federal Bancshares Of Arkansas Inc The First Of Long Island Corp. 
First Federal Bankshares Inc The Savannah Bancorp Inc 
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First Financial Bancorp TIB Financial Corp. 
First Financial Bankshares Inc Tierone Corp. 
First Financial Corp. Timberland Bancorp Inc 
First Financial Holdings Inc Tompkins Financial Corp. 
First Franklin Corp. Tower Bancorp Inc 
First Georgia Community Corp. Tower Financial Corp. 
First Horizon National Corp. Tri City Bankshares Corp. 
First Interstate Bancsystem Tri County Financial Corp. 
First Keystone Corp. Trico Bancshares 
First Keystone Financial Inc Trustco Bank Corp. NY 
First M & F Corp. Trustmark Corp. 
First Mariner Bancorp Ucbh Holdings Inc 
First Merchants Corp. UMB Financial Corp. 
First National Bancshares Inc Umpqua Holdings Corp. 
First National Community Bancorp Inc Union Bankshares Inc 
First National Corp. Capital Stock Union First Market Bankshares Corp. 
First Niagara Financial Group Inc Union National Financial Corp. 
First Northern Community Bancorp United Bancorp Inc Michigan 
First Pactrust Bancorp Inc United Bancorp Inc Ohio 
First Place Financial Corp. UNITED BANCSHARES. INC. 
First Regional Bancorp United Bankshares Inc 
First Reliance Bancshares Inc United Community Banks Inc 
First Robinson Financial Corp. United Community Financial Corp. 
First Security Group Inc United Security Bancshares 
First South Bancorp Inc United Security Bancshares Inc 
First South Bancorp Virginia Inc United Western Bancorp Inc 
First State Bancorporation Unity Bancorp Inc 
First United Corp. Univest Corp. Of Pennsylvania 
First West Virginia Bancorp Inc US Bancorp 
Firstbank Corp. Uwharrie Capital Corp. 
Firstfed Financial Corp. Valley National Bancorp 
Firstmerit Corp. Village Bank And Trust Financial Corp. 
Flagstar Bancorp Inc Virginia Commerce Bancorp Inc 
Flatbush Federal Bancorp Inc Vist Financial Corp. 
Florida Community Banks Inc VSB BANCORP. INC. 
FNB Corp. W Holding Company Inc 
FNB United Corp. Waccamaw Bankshares Inc 
Four Oaks Fincorp Inc Wainwright Bank & Trust Company 
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FPB Bancorp Inc Wake Forest Bancshares Inc 
Franklin Financial Services Corp. Washington Banking Company 
Frontier Financial Corp. Washington Federal Inc 
German American Bancorp Inc Washington Mutual Inc 
Glacier Bancorp Inc Washington Trust Bancorp Inc 
Glen Burnie Bancorp Wayne Savings Bancshares Inc 
Gouverneur Bancorp Inc Webster Financial Corp. 
Grandsouth Bancorporation Wells Fargo & Co 
Great Southern Bancorp Inc Wesbanco Inc 
Greater Atlantic Financial Corp. WEST BANCORPORATION. INC. 
Green Bankshares Inc Westamerica Bancorporation 
Greene County Bancorp Inc Westfield Financial Inc 
Greer Bancshares Inc Wgnb Corp. 
GS Financial Corp. Wilber Corp. 
Habersham Bancorp Wilmington Trust Corp. 
Hampton Roads Bankshares Inc Wilshire Bancorp Inc 
Hancock Holding Company WILSON BANK HOLDING COMPANY 
Harleysville National Corp. Wintrust Financial Corp. 
Harleysville Savings Financial WSFS Financial Corp. 
Harvest Community Bank WVS Financial Corp. 
Hawthorn Bancshares Inc Yadkin Valley Financial Corp. 
Hcsb Financial Corp. Zions Bancorporation 
Heartland Financial USA Inc 
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Table 2: Statistical measures of the sample‘s dependent variables  
SAMPLE             
  ΕΒΙΤ 
Ret. 
Earn. 
Sales Liabilities Equity Debt Assets 
Mean 217.036 526.1966 690.67 8862.408 829.733 2344.13 9707.99 
Median 13.155 33.33 46.675 635.71 62.085 85.91 697.08 
Std. Dev. 1532.59 3555.214 5024.7 65869.74 5993.37 20195.5 71875.2 
Min. -58.27 -34.96 0.13 2.57 -1.85 0 1.77 
Max. 39007 79024 116574 1324465 132421 504827 1459737 
Skewness 14.4034 13.03978 14.102 14.00813 14.8629 16.0583 14.0549 
Kurtosis 261.756 207.187 238.62 223.2594 258.551 308.342 225.488 
Observ. 2838             
 
 
Table 3: Statistical measures of the sample‘s dependent financial ratios 
SAMPLE             
  R.E./assets 
EBIT/ 
assets 
sales/assets D / E ROA ROE NIM 
Mean 0.0459471 0.01804689 0.07445781 1.645 1.302 11.55 3.953 
Median 0.0504443 0.01874963 0.06584165 1.297 1.35 11.72 3.9 
Std. Dev. 0.0850216 0.02276287 0.20999911 1.462 1.594 17.4 0.888 
Min. -3.6497175 -1.02259887 0.00573731 -1.6 -44.3 -239 1.32 
Max. 0.2016395 0.0922943 9.83050847 12.16 40.15 734.1 8.32 
Skewness -31.848031 -34.879595 39.2433488 2.141 
-
9.906 
29.1 0.586 
Kurtosis 1310.9323 1554.5322 1712.57154 7.131 537.9 1288 1.67 
Observ. 2838             
 
Table 4: Statistical measures of the bankrupt bank‘s dependent variables 
BANKRUPT             
  ΕΒΙΤ 
Ret. 
Earn. 
Sales Liabilities Equity Debt Assets 
Mean 157.349 325.3855 406.8 5272.226 462.396 1653.43 5742.97 
Median 12.54 26.655 48.115 565.195 55.425 71.86 622.57 
Std. Dev. 925.664 1818.84 2230.3 29272.96 2344.13 10875 31661.6 
Min. -4.8 -15.36 1.53 20.94 4.06 0 27.15 
Max. 9412 20931 26291 316871 27616 117895 346288 
Skewness 9.17563 9.213273 9.166 9.196612 9.2805 9.27556 9.20708 
Kurtosis 85.6074 88.88369 86.943 86.22643 90.8482 87.112 86.6498 
Observ. 540             
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Table 5: Statistical measures of the bankrupt bank‘s dependent financial ratios 
BANKRUPT             
  R.E./assets 
EBIT/ 
assets 
sales/assets D / E ROA ROE NIM 
Mean 0.0439533 0.01920031 0.06923248 1.766 1.362 11.59 4.124 
Median 0.0456839 0.01864657 0.06674583 1.296 1.33 12.22 4.03 
Std. Dev. 0.0368308 0.01015026 0.01523753 1.709 0.766 6.983 1.078 
Min. -0.0696133 -0.03083309 0.03227233 0 -3.48 -39.5 1.32 
Max. 0.1822483 0.06136601 0.15687586 10.56 7.24 38.03 7.8 
Skewness 0.3510949 -0.15854663 1.40405005 2.148 
-
0.104 
-1.85 0.451 
Kurtosis 0.9057172 3.91595661 3.66916394 5.718 12.16 11.02 0.335 
Observ. 540             
 
Table 6: Statistical measures of the nonbankrupt bank‘s dependent variables 
NONBANKRUPT             
  ΕΒΙΤ 
Ret. 
Earn. 
Sales Liabilities Equity Debt Assets 
Mean 231.062 573.4256 757.38 9706.054 916.052 2506.44 10639.7 
Median 13.28 34.6 46.66 645.9 63.11 88.24 708.5 
Std. Dev. 1642.84 3850.309 5476.5 71791.47 6560.22 21814 78362.8 
Min. -58.27 -34.96 0.13 2.57 -1.85 0 1.77 
Max. 39007 79024 116574 1324465 132421 504827 1459737 
Skewness 14.0438 12.42699 13.279 13.19036 13.8666 15.4551 13.225 
Kurtosis 242.285 184.199 207.37 193.9721 221.088 277.913 195.667 
Observ. 2298             
 
Table 7: Statistical measures of the nonbankrupt bank‘s dependent financial ratios 
NONBANKRUPT             
  R.E./assets 
EBIT/ 
assets 
sales/assets D / E ROA ROE NIM 
Mean 0.0464161 0.01777585 0.0756857 1.617 1.288 11.54 3.913 
Median 0.0521242 0.0187863 0.06568567 1.298 1.35 11.59 3.88 
Std. Dev. 0.092789 0.02480721 0.23324786 1.396 1.733 19.05 0.832 
Min. -3.6497175 -1.02259887 0.00573731 -1.6 -44.3 -239 1.47 
Max. 0.2016395 0.0922943 9.83050847 12.16 40.15 734.1 8.32 
Skewness -30.288717 -33.2582988 35.3623717 2.083 
-
9.513 
27.45 0.55 
Kurtosis 1142.2885 1359.91765 1389.15993 7.31 475.4 1109 2.092 
Observ. 2298             
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